Investigation needed: many persons in Portland and other Occupy encampments report flu-like symptoms. The question is whether certain non-flu, non-cold symptoms match; the context is a government that clearly hates and is violent towards dissent, a government that experiments with tularemia
Over the past few months, several persons have reported to me that they have suffered flu-like symptoms after participating at Occupy events. Naturally, influenza and rhinoviruses will appear amid campers in winter. The question is whether something more insidious has appeared.
I will first relate my own experience: I was at several Portland Occupy events, for example, the Eviction Party on November 13th and 14th. I had had cold-like symptoms before that, but in December, I began to feel that I had something more severe. By January, I had felt malaise for some time, and my right eye became occluded and infected. I had a headache that followed me for day after day, and I began to have fevers, bronchial irritation, sweating, etc. I went to an urgent-care clinic in January with fever and malaise, and became too weak to stand for a chest x-ray. I was rushed to the ER with an antibiotic IV, and it was determined that I had sepsis (infection of the blood). No bacterial type was identified to me, however.
After antibiotic treatment, the symptoms disappeared, then reappeared a week later. I took more antibiotics and felt better again. Just this week this cycle repeated. Clearly there is some underlying infection, and at this writing I am waiting for an agglutination test-- for acute tularemia. (What I really need is a serum reactivity test, as I would have to catch the bacterium in flagrante delicto with agglutination.)
Why tularemia? Tularemia is just my guess, based on the information I am going to share here; I prevailed upon my doctor, explaining that the procedure would lighten my suspicions and thus make me feel better. Tularemia, "rabbit fever," has a history of weaponization. It is perfect to use (if you are sufficiently lacking in morality) against a dissenting group within society, because it is rare in the field, and easily mimics influenza/pneumonia. It kills few while debilitating many. It is stocked at the US Army biological warfare unit (USAMRIID) in Ft. Detrick, Maryland, and has recently been in use there:
[excerpt; more at link]
Sick Detrick researcher moved to Walter Reed Army hospital
Originally published December 10, 2009
The Fort Detrick researcher who became ill from the bacteria she
studies is recovering at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in
The military researcher has been sick since at least Nov. 23 and was
put on antibiotics Dec. 1, when doctors in the U.S. Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases' Special Immunizations
Program clinic believed she may be infected from the tularemia
bacteria she handles.
She had been recovering at home, and USAMRIID reports she was
responding well to the treatment there. Doctors moved her to the Army
hospital Monday evening so she could receive the antibiotics
intravenously, USAMRIID spokeswoman Caree Vander Linden said.
The woman's condition is improving, Vander Linden said.
Lab tests this week confirmed the woman contracted tularemia, but
USAMRIID is still investigating how she was infected.
She was working alone in her lab with bacteria cultures, not with
infected animals, Vander Linden said last week.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention considers tularemia
dangerous because it could be used as an aerosol bioweapon. The Fort
Detrick researcher was working to create a vaccine for the disease,
which infects about 200 people each year. The disease cannot be passed
from person to person.
Most cases of tularemia stem from tick bites or from people handling
sick rabbits and rodents, though there have been some documented cases
of people becoming ill after inhaling the bacteria.
Symptoms usually include skin ulcers at the site the bacteria entered
the body, as well as swollen lymph nodes in some cases.
Vander Linden said the woman likely did not report her illness to her
superiors sooner because she thought she had the flu. Tularemia can
cause flulike symptoms, such as cough, chest pain and difficulty
breathing, when the bacteria is inhaled or when it has been in a body
so long that the infection spreads through the bloodstream to the
Tularemia is classified as a Biosafety Level 3 pathogen, meaning it
can be fatal in humans but some vaccine or treatment exists. Anthrax,
SARS, West Nile virus and yellow fever virus are among the diseases in
that category. In a Biosafety Level 3 lab, air always flows from the
hallway to the changing rooms to the labs, so contaminants can't
escape the lab, and the air is filtered before it leaves the building.
Vander Linden said all safety procedures were in place in the
researchers lab and that others are not at risk. [....]
Here is more:
link to www.upmc-biosecurity.org
F. tularensis is considered to be a serious potential bioterrorist
threat because it is one of the most infectious pathogenic bacteria
known—inhalation of as few as 10 organisms can cause disease—and it
has substantial capacity to cause serious illness and death. The
bacterium was developed into an aerosol biological weapon by several
countries in the past.
Aerosol dissemination of F. tularensis in a populated area would be
expected to result in the abrupt onset of large numbers of cases of
acute, nonspecific respiratory febrile illness beginning 3 to 5 days
later. (See "The History of Bioterrorism: Tularemia," a short video
from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC].)
A World Health Organization (WHO) expert committee reported in 1970
that if 50 kg (110 pounds) of virulent F. tularensis were dispersed as
an aerosol over a metropolitan area with a population of 5 million,
there would be an estimated 250,000 incapacitating casualties,
including 19,000 deaths.
Human-to-human transmission is not known to occur.
Infection Control Measures
Since tularemia is not spread from person to person, it is not
necessary to place patients diagnosed with tularemia in isolation.
Symptoms of tularemia depend on the virulence of the bacterial strain
and route of infection. Symptoms of all forms of tularemia typically
include fever, headache, body aches, and malaise. Symptoms usually
develop within 3 to 5 days of infection; however, the incubation
period can be 1 to 14 days. Naturally occurring tularemia infection
can take several forms, as outlined in the table below. Pneumonic
tularemia (the form expected from an aerosol release) is likely to
cause typical symptoms of pneumonia (eg, fever, cough, and shortness
of breath). Definitive diagnosis requires confirmation by laboratory
Tularemia: Forms, Routes of Infection, and Symptoms [edited for relevance and clarity]
• Swollen and painful lymph glands without the development of ulcers
Direct contamination of the eye with F. tularensis
• Pain, redness, swelling, and discharge of the eyes
• Development of an ulcer on the inside of the eyelid in some cases
Oropharyngeal: Eating or drinking contaminated food or water; inhaling
aerosolized F. tularensis
• Sore throat or tonsillitis
• Vomiting and diarrhea
• Possible swelling of the glands in the neck
Pneumonic: Inhaling aerosolized F. tularensis; or secondary spread to
lungs from another site of infection
• Sore throat and swelling of the lymph nodes in the lungs
• Sudden fever, chills, headache, muscle aches, joint pain, dry cough,
and progressive weakness
• Systemic illness (fever, chills, headache, etc.) without indication
of site of infection or localized symptoms
• Potentially severe and fatal
• Systemic illness (fever, chills, headache, etc.)
• Patient typically appears toxic; may develop confusion and coma
• Without prompt treatment, may lead to septic shock, acute
respiratory distress syndrome, and organ failure
Clinicians who suspect tularemia should promptly obtain blood and
other cultures, as appropriate, and alert the laboratory to the need
for special diagnostic and safety procedures. F. tularensis may be
identified through direct examination of secretions, exudates, or
biopsy specimens using Gram stain, direct fluorescent antibody, or
immunohistochemical stains. It can be grown from pharyngeal washings,
sputum specimens, and even fasting gastric aspirates in a high
proportion of patients with inhalational tularemia. It is only
occasionally isolated from blood. Rapid diagnostic tests are not
widely available; ancillary confirmatory testing via microscopic
demonstration of F. tularensis using fluorescent-labeled antibodies is
a rapid diagnostic procedure performed in designated reference
laboratories in the National Public Health Laboratory Network. Test
results can be available within several hours if the laboratory is
alerted and prepared. Growth of F. tularensis in culture is the
definitive means of confirming the diagnosis and usually takes 24 to
48 hours in ideal conditions. However, in some instances, growth of
the bacteria can be delayed up to 10 days.
The overall case fatality rate for untreated infections with Type A
strains has been 5% to 15%, but in pneumonic or septic cases, without
antibiotic treatment, the fatality rate has been as high as 30% to
60%. With treatment, the most recent fatality rates in the U.S. have
Prophylaxis and Treatment
Early antibiotic therapy is recommended for persons exposed to or
infected with tularemia. Tetracyclines (eg, doxycycline),
fluoroquinolones (eg, ciprofloxacin), and aminoglycosides (eg,
streptomycin and gentamicin) are all effective treatments and
doxycycline or a fluroquinolone can be used for prophylaxis after high
risk exposure. Following a biological attack, treatment
recommendations would depend on antibiotic susceptibility of the
strain of bacteria used in the attack.
Since person-to-person transmission is not known to occur,
post-exposure prophylaxis of close contacts with persons infected with
tularemia is unnecessary.
[more at link]
Tularemia is weaponized, q.e.d., and available at the same Pentagon-directed
site that was the source for the Ames strain weaponized anthrax used
in the 2001 attacks.
William C. Patrick III, 84, one of the chief scientists at the Army
Biological Warfare Laboratories at Fort Detrick and who was
responsible for overseeing the military's top-secret weaponization of
some of the world's deadliest diseases, including anthrax and
tularemia, died of bladder cancer Oct. 1 at Citizens Nursing Home in
Mr. Patrick held five classified U.S. patents for the process of
weaponizing anthrax. He was chief of the development program at Fort
Detrick in Frederick for much of the Cold War.
In the 1960s, Mr. Patrick led the highly classified weaponization of
tularemia, a disease he considered superior to anthrax as a biological
agent because of its potency.
Under Mr. Patrick's direction, scientists at Fort Detrick developed a
tularemia agent that, if disseminated by airplane, could cause
casualties and sickness over thousands of square miles, according to
tests carried out by the U.S. government.
[....] more at link
And here is the incident in 2005 which raises my suspicions highest.
[Note: the link below was removed as of this week. Here is most of the article.]
Biological alarm in Washington
Did terrorists attack Washington with a deadly pathogen?
By Mark Benjamin
On Sept. 24, 2005, tens of thousands of protesters marched past the
White House and flooded the National Mall near 17th Street and
Constitution Avenue. They had arrived from all over the country for a
day of speeches and concerts to protest the war in Iraq. It may have
been the biggest antiwar rally since Vietnam. A light rain fell early
in the day and most of the afternoon was cool and overcast.
Unknown to the crowd, biological-weapons sensors, scattered for miles
across Washington by the Department of Homeland Security, were quietly
doing their work. The machines are designed to detect killer
pathogens. Sometime between 10 a.m. on Sept. 24 and 10 a.m. on Sept.
25, six of those machines sucked in trace amounts of deadly bacteria
called Francisella tularensis. The government fears it is one of six
biological weapons most likely to be used against the United States.
It was an alarming reading. The biological-weapons detection system in
Washington had never set off any alarms before. There are more than
150 sensors spread across 30 of the most populated cities in America.
But this was the first time that six sensors in any one place had
detected a toxin at the same time. The sensors are also located miles
from one another, suggesting that the pathogen was airborne and
probably not limited to a local environmental source.
William Stanhope, associate director for special projects at the St.
Louis University School of Public Health's Institute for Biosecurity,
has been closely following scattered government and news reports about
the incident. He's convinced it was a botched terrorist attack. "I
think we were lucky and the terrorists were not good," he says. "I am
stunned that this has not been more of a story."
The DHS scrambled for three days to confirm just what may have been in
the air that day. On Sept. 27, it turned for help to the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention. The CDC did its own tests, and on
Sept. 30 — six days after the deadly pathogens set off the sensors and
well into the incubation period for tularemia — alerted public health
officials across the country to be on the lookout for tularemia, the
deadly disease caused by F. tularensis.
"It is alarming that health officials ... were only notified six days
after the bacteria was first detected," House Government Reform
chairman Tom Davis, R-Va., wrote in an Oct. 3 letter to Homeland
Security Secretary Michael Chertoff. "Have DHS and CDC analysts been
able to determine if the pathogen detected was naturally occurring or
the result of a terrorist attack?"
Government officials say the sensors detected a natural event. "There
is no known nexus to terror or criminal behavior," Russ Knocke,
spokesman for the Department of Homeland Security, told the Washington
Post. "We believe this to be environmental." "It is not unreasonable
that this is a natural occurrence," says Von Roebuck, spokesman for
the CDC. "There are still no cases of tularemia."
However, Salon has spoken to numerous people who were at the
Washington Mall on Sept. 24. Four say they got sick days later with
symptoms that mirror tularemia.
Relatively speaking, F. tularensis is an effective biological weapon.
A little bit goes a long, deadly way. A tiny amount — 10 microscopic
organisms — can cause tularemia. After an incubation period of three
to five days (it can range from one to 14 days), tularemia attacks the
lymph nodes, lungs, spleen, liver and kidneys. Symptoms include fever,
chills, headache, muscle aches, joint pain, dry cough and progressive
weakness. Left untreated, tularemia can kill 50 percent of those
who've contracted it. Conventional strains of the bacteria do respond
to antibiotics, reducing death rates to as low as 2 percent.
As with anthrax, the U.S. military weaponized and stockpiled F.
tularensis in the 1960s. The Soviets are said to have engineered
strains to be resistant to antibiotics and vaccines. A World Health
Organization Committee in 1969 estimated that dispersal of 110 pounds
of F. tularensis over a city of 5 million would incapacitate 250,000
people and 19,000 of them would die.
"The biggest concern is that a terrorist would use the organism
because it has such a high infectivity rate with a low number of
organisms," says Dr. Steven Hinrichs, director of the University of
Nebraska Center for Biosecurity.
Scientists have long said that if terrorists use tularemia in an
attack, it will look like this: The bacteria will show up in the air
in a city, rather than the country, and perhaps at a major event.
"If Francisella tularensis were used as a bioweapon, the bacteria
would likely be made airborne so they could be inhaled," the CDC warns
in an information sheet on tularemia. In a June 2001 consensus
statement titled "Tularemia as a Biological Weapon," the American
Medical Association warned an attack would come in "an aerosol
release" in "a densely populated area."
There is no evidence that terrorists have ever used tularemia as a
biological weapon before, but it may have been used by the Soviets
against German troops during the 1942 Battle of Stalingrad, according
to a report by the Council on Foreign Relations. The report adds that
microbe stocks in Russia, Kazakhstan, Georgia and Uzbekistan are
insecure and terrorists could potentially steal weaponized strains of
tularemia from them.
So far, there are no signs of a tularemia outbreak in the U.S. But
because it comes on like the flu, it is unclear if the government
would even know if a few people from the Mall that day scattered
across the United States had tularemia. The amount detected in the
sensors suggests a very small amount was in the air.
"Clinicians don't often think of it, and it has a non-specific
presentation," says Jeff Bender, an infectious disease epidemiologist
at the University of Minnesota. "It is basically flu-like symptoms
that sound like every other disease you can get."
Like anthrax, F. tularensis is a naturally occurring bacteria. It is
typically found in small mammals like squirrels, water rats and
rabbits, which is why tularemia has also been called rabbit fever.
Those critters get it mostly from bites by ticks, flies and
mosquitoes. People have contracted tularemia from insect bites or from
handling or eating infected material or skinning dead animals. F.
tularensis is a concern mostly in central and Western states,
particularly Missouri, Arkansas, Oklahoma, South Dakota and Montana.
Nearly all cases occur in rural areas, according to the CDC. Around
125 people in the United States get tularemia each year. Most cases in
the United States appear to have come from insect bites or handling
Although insects mostly transmit the disease, there have been cases
where the bacteria appears to have become aerosolized in the natural
environment. Bacteria from a dead animal could contaminate some soil.
In the right conditions, the bacteria might stay viable in the
environment for weeks. The soil might then get stirred up and cause
the bacteria to be airborne. Fifteen cases of tularemia were reported
in Martha's Vineyard in 2000, apparently after lawn mowers or brush
cutters stirred up contaminated material into the air. One person
died. Public officials have theorized something similar happened in
Washington: The bacteria got into the soil on the mall and it was the
marchers themselves who kicked it up into the air.
It is unclear if such a scenario explains what happened on Sept. 24.
"The fact that it happened in six locations would have supported an
attack scenario," says Hinrichs from the University of Nebraska Center
for Biosecurity. Hinrichs has not seen any test results proving that
what was in the air that day was a deadly pathogen. Still, he says
that government officials would have to consider the incident as more
than a natural event. "To have found it in all six would have raised
their level of suspicion," says Hinrichs. "It could be a failed
The sensors that picked up on the pathogen are part of the Department
of Homeland Security's Bio Watch program. Since Sept. 11, sensors have
been placed in 30 of the most populated cities in the United States.
Most cities have roughly 12 sensors, although Washington is thought to
The exact locations of the sensors are a secret. Some are piggybacked
onto existing air monitoring stations, used by the EPA to measure
pollution. The sensors look for signs of the six pathogens scientists
consider most likely to be used as biological weapons by terrorists,
including F. tularensis. (Other pathogens include anthrax, smallpox
Sept. 24 was not the first time the Bio Watch sensors had detected
possible biological weapons pathogens. Since the system was deployed,
sensors around the United States have identified pathogens that could
be used as biological weapons on five separate occasions, Jeffrey
Stiefel, program manager for Bio Watch chemical countermeasures, said
at an open lecture at the National Institutes of Health on Oct. 6. In
all of those cases, the detections were apparently the result of
natural phenomena. Indeed, some critics have long worried that one
weakness of the Bio Watch program might be the difficulty of
distinguishing between natural events and terrorism.
In 2003, two Bio Watch sensors detected F. tularensis near Houston in
what the government later determined was a natural event, though the
environmental source was never identified. But this was the first time
anything popped up in Washington. "This is the first time we have had
a situation there that I am aware of," says the CDC's Roebuck. It is
also the first time six sensors simultaneously picked up on the same
thing. "It has never happened that way before — that many," Stiefel of
the DHS said in his lecture.
Just after the antiwar rally, DHS officials faced a perplexing
situation. While the six sensors detected something, at first it was
not clear what it was.
Filters are removed from the sensors usually every 24 hours. A
laboratory then performs a preliminary test to look for signs of a
deadly pathogen. Six filters from the Mall showed the existence of a
possible pathogen during that first round of tests.
A second round of tests could confirm the presence of F. tularensis
using polymerase chain reaction techniques, which detect DNA
signatures. The second round of tests was conducted sometime between
Sept. 25 and Sept. 27. But in the second round of tests, none of the
samples from the filters was a full DNA confirmation that what was
floating around Washington that day was definitely F. tularensis. But
it looked like it could be.
"The collectors were concentrated along the Mall," Stiefel said in his
lecture. "That starts to say, 'Something looks a little funny here.
The bottom line here is that there is something out there."
This posed a quandary for department officials. Under the Bio Watch
program, substances detected that are not confirmed positive pathogens
can be ignored. But six sensors had detected the same thing in
Washington during the biggest peace march in a generation. And
Washington, D.C., is not exactly tularemia country.
There was another troubling thing. One of the sensors that went off
was located at the Lincoln Memorial on the far western end of the
Mall. Another was located near Judiciary Square, roughly two miles to
the east and two blocks north of the Mall. A third was at the Army's
Fort McNair, more than two miles from the Lincoln Memorial down the
Potomac River past the Mall, on the point of land where the Washington
Channel and Anacostia River meet. The locations of the other three
sensors have not been disclosed.
This makes a natural event on Sept. 24 more difficult to imagine.
Under the government's scenario, soil on or near the Mall somehow
became contaminated with the bacteria, perhaps from the body or blood
of a dead or injured small rabbit or squirrel. That soil then got
stirred up — possibly by the marchers themselves — and floated across
the Mall and beyond. Marchers and book festival attendees contacted by
Salon say it was dusty on the Mall in the morning. But it rained early
that day and stayed moist, making the dust theory perhaps less likely,
at least after that rain.
"One sensor, I'd say maybe," says biosecurity expert Stanhope of the
dust theory. "Two sensors is a stretch. Six sensors? I'm sorry, you
don't have enough money to buy enough martinis to make me believe that
it is naturally occurring at six different sites. I don't think you
could get me that drunk to believe that."
As for how the bacteria may have erupted through natural processes,
says Hinrichs of the University of Nebraska Center, "I can't imagine
how it could have happened." Asked if he could imagine a scenario
whereby F. tularensis could float around the Mall in the dust, Bender,
an infectious disease epidemiologist, says, "Theoretically, it is
possible." Asked if it could have been an attack, he says, "The
question you are asking, 'Was this real or not?' That is a very valid
Another possibility is that somebody was testing U.S. biological
weapons defenses. How sensitive are the sensors? How quickly and
effectively can the government react?
"The Department of Homeland Security would have to consider the
possibility that it was neither natural nor an attack, but that it was
a testing of the system," says Alan Pearson, a former DHS official,
who is now the biological and chemical weapons director at the Center
for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, a nonpartisan organization.
"Was somebody trying to see what would happen?"
Regardless of the source, Pearson says, he was troubled that it took
the government nearly a week to alert the public. "It points out that
the system is still not working fast enough," he says. "If it turned
out to be something that really affected people, which it turned out
not to be, the system was too slow."
The federal government says that the most compelling argument against
a terrorist attack is that nobody got tularemia. That may be true. But
some people say they caught something that day.
Mike Phelps, 45, says he attended the rally in Washington that day,
traveling round trip by bus from Raleigh, N.C. On Sept. 27, he came
down with a fever, sore throat and headache. Within days, he was
coughing up dark phlegm. When he blew his nose, it would bleed. "It
was gross," he says. "I literally vomited out cup loads of phlegm.
Most of it was dark-colored. I've never had anything like this
Phelps' doctor said he had pneumonia and prescribed antibiotics. A few
days later, Phelps read about the tularemia scare and called his
doctor. His doctor told him that if it was tularemia, he would have
prescribed him the same antibiotics. Phelps says he called the CDC but
was transferred to an automated system. Frustrated, he hung up.
Several members of the women's peace group, Code Pink, also from North
Carolina, who attended the march, say they got sick afterward.
Stephanie Eriksen, a 46-year-old network engineer for AT&T, says she
developed swollen glands and cold symptoms in her throat and chest.
She developed a persistent cough that still lingers. "My throat has
still not recovered completely," she says. Eriksen says her
14-year-old daughter marched in Washington and got sick. She was
tested for strep throat. Eriksen said the results were negative.
Aimee Schmidt, a Code Pink member and student at North Carolina State,
says that she developed flu-like symptoms and a raging headache that
lasted three days after the march. She says her eyes hurt and her
whole body ached. She never went to the doctor. "I made a choice, wise
or not, to just deal with it," she says.
Of course, there are countless benign explanations for these symptoms.
And it could be true that nobody got sick from F. tularensis on Sept.
24. But bioterror experts say that doesn't prove it wasn't a terrorist
attack. The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, they point out, made several
unsuccessful biological weapons attacks before the sarin attack in the
Tokyo subway system on March 20, 1995. Previous efforts by the cult to
release a botulin toxin from a vehicle in 1990, and anthrax spores
from a building in 1993, apparently failed to sicken or kill anyone
because of faulty dispersal methods.
Terrorists may have made a similar screw-up in Washington on Sept. 24.
"One of my working hypotheses is that there was an attack and they
failed in their dispersion system," says Stanhope. "They dispersed an
incredibly low concentration."
Government assurances that there is "nothing to see here" are
reminiscent of the federal government's initial response to the
infamous anthrax attacks in fall of 2001. In an Oct. 4, 2001, press
conference, then-Department of Health and Human Services Secretary
Tommy Thompson emphasized that anthrax occurs naturally in the
environment and that "there's no evidence of terrorism."
"I want everyone to understand that sporadic cases of anthrax do
[naturally] occur in the United States," Thompson said. Thompson said
the first victim to fall ill, a Florida man, was an "outdoorsman" and
that investigators were looking into a stream he may have drank from
in North Carolina. That man, Bob Stevens, 63, died the next day from
inhaling weaponized anthrax that was apparently sent to the offices of
American Media Inc. in Boca Raton, Fla.
Soon after, anthrax was sent to the office of Sen. Tom Daschle, D-S.D.
Government officials claimed it was a "common variety" and not the
weaponized agent most feared. Of course, further investigation proved
Currently, the investigation into what happened on Sept. 24 is
ongoing. Government officials have apparently been taking soil samples
around the Mall, attempting to pinpoint a natural source for F.
tularensis. In the meantime, on Oct. 5, the National Institutes of
Health announced it would award two contracts worth a total of $60
million to develop new tularemia vaccine candidates. The announcement
said nothing of the events 11 days earlier.
[more at link]
Here, then, is my summary: Investigation of the Occu-flu is necessary, because of the social and historic context of anti-dissent activity on the part of the US government in its various agencies, because of the anthrax attacks of 2001, and because Occupy activists have suffered, and continue to suffer from symptoms that closely match weaponized tularemia.
Your input is needed. The first part of the investigation will determine whether a unique set of symptoms, distinguishable from influenza, exist; the second (much harder) will be to determine whether tularemia or some other weaponizable agent is present in the Occupy population; and the third (harder still) will be to find out who has spread the agent, if it exists.
Finally, there is this question: I remember (it took some prodding) that there were persons who, on or around November 13th in the afternoon, were spraying something at people and even at cops, for no particular reason. They had spray bottles and indicated that it was some sort of protest, even though no such tactic had been discussed at meetings, so far as I know. Do you know anything about that? If so, please respond below; and please report your symptoms below, if relevant.
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