Hey, that a nice crack you have!
In 1976 the U. S. government authorized an encryption standard called DES, a 56-bit algorithm that was developed under contract for the NSA and which -- at the time it was released as a standard up until 1999 -- was touted as acceptable encryption for non-classified communications and other types of numerical data.
"Non-classified" because the encryption process wasn't very good and the NSA was well aware of the short coming from their standard. (Indeed, the admonishment to not utilize the method for classified work was likely because NSA computers were probably advanced enough to make DES cracking nearly real time and -- while backwards -- Soviet computers would eventually catch up.)
NSA computer systems aren't measured in MIPS -- millions of instructions a second -- like normal computer networks are. NSA had measured its processor power in yards of etched silicon prior to the Bush regime. With massive funding of the NSA under the Bush regime to coincide with the regime's war crime atrocities abroad and massive treason against America, the NSA now measures its processor power in _miles_ of silicon.
56-bit cracks in the private sector are today accomplished within 12 hours on a single computer (Electronic Frontier Foundation's "Deep Crack" machine is a good example; distributed.net is another good example) so you can bet that the NRA cracks 56-bit encrypted messages real time, even DES voice over Frame Relay, ISDN, or IP.
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) offers superior algorithms and longer bit keys but with the computing power now in the hands of this fascist Bush regime, it's likely that even PGP's implementation of the IDEA algorithm with 1024/2048 bit keys is crackable within reasonable periods of time.
When this fascist regime seized power in 2000 the fascists were stomping down hard on companies that wrote software trying to stop them from including strong encryption in their products -- for domestic use as well as abroad. With the massive NRA funding, the fascist regime no longer much cares whether things are encrypted or not.
Still, in a fascist regime which admits it's reading all of our emails and wiretapping our telephones, to _not_ encrypt to at least try to slow these terrorist traitors down some is wrong. PGP should be used routinely; it should be used as a matter of course in people's day-to-day emails. Encryption to keep private conversations out of the hands of these fascists -- even for a few hours -- should be the norm rather than the exception.
If more people employed encryption in their daily usage, encryption processes would become better, more capable of thwarting these fascists. If more people encrypted, the fascist regime would be forced to purchase more computing power and be reduced to having to prioritize the innocent victims they're committing treason against.