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The U.S. Military sees you as a threat

The Bush administration and US military have been actively lobbying for the right to use military personnel to spy on U.S. citizens and share information with other intelligence agencies. The Military does not have to comply with the same legal oversight as other domestic agencies.
The Department of Defense is seeking additional legal authority to spy inside the US. They want to expand personnel and funding for an agency called Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) created three years ago. The White House tried to push a proposal through the Senate Intelligence Committee and several other unspecified fronts. The proposal, made by a presidential commission, would transform the CIFA from an office that coordinates efforts within military branches into one that instigates, investigates and prosecutes crimes within US borders including US citizens. Crimes investigated include economic espionage, ecological espionage, treason, terrorism or sabotage.

The Pentagon has also pushed legislation that would create an exception to the Privacy Act. They want free flowing data access between the FBI, CIA, NSA and other intelligence services. Backers to these measures say this would help find terror threats such as Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Civil liberties advocates as well as a few members of congress are complaining these and similar proposals are proceeding with little comment from congress or knowledge by the public at large.

Senator Ron Wyden has requested Defense Intelligence Agency officers should not be allowed to hide the fact that they work for the government when seeking intelligence information. He believes more hearings should be held. Advocates are concerned information would be shared between intelligence agencies about people who have committed no crimes and have no previous connection to terrorism or espionage.

This removes one of the few privacy protections against sharing of secret dossiers on Americans by government intelligence agencies. A Pentagon Spokesman said senior Defense Department intelligence officials are aware of the sensitivities related to their expanded domestic activities. At the same time, he said, the Pentagon has to have the intelligence necessary to protect its facilities and personnel at home and abroad.

Currently the CIFA has 290 intelligence analysts in the North Command or "Northcom". They coordinate reports from the FBI, CIA and other US agencies. In addition each branch of the military has already started domestic intelligence programs reportedly aimed at gathering information. The Air force has a group called Eagle Eye, the Marine Corps has specific policies regarding techniques of "collection, retention and dissemination of information concerning U.S. persons," according to a Marine Corps order approved on April 30, 2004.

The order recognizes that in the post-9/11 era, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity will be "increasingly required to perform domestic missions," and as a result, "there will be increased instances whereby Marine intelligence activities may come across information regarding U.S. persons." Among domestic targets listed are people in the United States who it "is reasonably believed threaten the physical security of Defense Department employees, installations, operations or official visitors."

Perhaps the prime illustration of the Pentagon's intelligence growth is CIFA, which remains one of its least publicized intelligence agencies. Neither the size of its staff, said to be more than 1,000, nor its budget is public, said the Pentagon spokesman. The CIFA brochure says the agency's mission is to "transform" the way counterintelligence is done "fully utilizing 21st century tools and resources."

One CIFA activity, threat assessments, involves using "leading edge information technologies and data harvesting," according to a February 2004 Pentagon budget document. This involves "exploiting commercial data" with the help of outside contractors including White Oak Technologies Inc. of Silver Spring, and MZM

DIRE CTIVE NUMBER 5105.67 28.Nov.2005 09:54

Repost in case the DoD takes these documents down...

Department of Defense

DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 5105.67

February 19, 2002

Certified Current as of November 21, 2003

DA&M

SUBJECT: Department of Defense Counterintelligence
Field Activity (DoD CIFA)

References: (a) Title 10, United States Code

(b) Presidential Decision Directive/National Security
Council-75, "U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness,
Counterintelligence for the 21st Century," December
28, 2000

(c) Executive Order 12958, "Classified National Security
Information," April 17, 1995

(d) DoD Directive O-5205.7, "Special Access Program
(SAP) Policy," January 13, 1997

(e) through (p), see enclosure 1

1. PURPOSE

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of
Defense by reference (a), this Directive establishes
the Department of Defense Counterintelligence Field
Activity with the mission, responsibilities, functions,
relationships, and authorities, as prescribed herein.

2. APPLICABILITY

This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands,
the Office of the Inspector General of the Department
of Defense, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field
Activities, as well as all other organizational entities
within the Department of Defense (hereafter referred
to collectively as "the DoD Components").

3. MISSION

The mission of the DoD CIFA is to develop and manage
DoD Counterintelligence (CI) programs and functions
that support the protection of the Department, including
CI support to protect DoD personnel, resources, critical
information, research and development programs, technology,
critical infrastructure, economic security, and U.S.
interests, against foreign influence and manipulation,
as well as to detect and neutralize espionage against
the Department.

4. POLICY

It is DoD policy that:

4.1. The Department shall fully support the National
Counterintelligence Program, as embodied in Presidential
Decision Directive/National Security Council-75 (PDD/NSC-75)
(reference (b)), and the National Counterintelligence
Executive (NCIX).

4.2. The Department will make full use of advanced
technology to create and maintain a collaborative CI
analytic environment to protect critical DoD and national
assets.

4.3. There is a single coordination focal point for
DoD CI policy implementation, Defense-wide CI resource
and budget planning, and for DoD CI implementation liaison
with the NCIX staff in accordance with reference (b).

4.4. All DoD CI matters and activities that affect
or are related to DoD Special Access Programs (SAPs)
shall comply with the security procedures of Executive
Order 12958 (reference (c)), DoD Directive O-5205.7
(reference (d)), and the DoD Overprint to the National
Industrial Security Program Operating Manual Supplement
(reference (e)).

5. ORGANIZATION

The DoD CIFA is hereby established as a Field Activity
within the Department of Defense, under the authority,
direction, and control of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)
(ASD(C3I)). For certain functions as specified in
this Directive or separately by the Secretary of Defense,
the DoD CIFA shall be treated as a Combat Support Agency.
It shall consist of:

5.1. A Director appointed by, and reporting to, the
ASD(C3I).

5.2. The Joint Counterintelligence Evaluation Office
(JCEO), the Joint CI Analysis Group (JCAG), the Defense
CI Information System (DCIIS) Program Office, the Joint
CI Training Academy (JCITA), and the Defense CI Force
Protection Response Group (FPRG). In carrying out
the mission of these elements, the Director of the DoD
CIFA may employ law enforcement personnel, in whole
or in part, as appropriate, to carry out the DoD CIFA's
law enforcement functions as stated in subparagraph
6.2.17. of this Directive.

5.3. Such additional subordinate organizational elements
as are established by the Director, DoD CIFA, within
authorized resources.

6. RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS

6.1. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence), pursuant to PDD/NSC-75
(reference (a)) and in accordance with Executive Order
12333, DoD Directive 5137.1, DoD Directive 5240.2, DoD
Directive 5240.1, DoD 5240.1-R, Appendix 3 of title
5, United States Code, and DoD Directive 5200.27 (references
(f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), and (l)), shall:

6.1.1. Exercise authority, direction, and control over
the Director, DoD CIFA.

6.1.2. Serve as the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor
to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding
all CI policies and related matters.

6.1.3. Represent the Secretary of Defense in all matters
with the NCIX.

6.1.4. Oversee the Defense CI Program.

6.2. The Director of the Department of Defense Counterintelligence
Field Activity, under the authority, direction, and
control of the ASD(C3I), shall:

6.2.1. Organize, direct, and manage the DoD CIFA and
all assigned resources.

6.2.2. Serve as the principal advisor on DoD CI operational
matters and policy-implementation activities to the
OSD Principal Staff Assistants and other DoD Component
officials and manage the execution of DoD CI policy
issued by the ASD(C3I), pursuant to DoD Directive 5137.1
(reference (g)).

6.2.3. Develop a DoD CI implementation strategy and
an implementation plan consistent with the national
CI strategy, national guidance, and DoD CI strategy;
the implementation plan shall include appropriate performance-measurement
standards and resource metrics consistent with these
aforementioned strategies.

6.2.4. Represent the Department with other Government
and non-government agencies, including the NCIX staff,
regarding the implementation of all DoD CI matters,
and shall:

6.2.4.1. Oversee DoD implementation support to the
NCIX organization.

6.2.4.2. Serve as the single coordination focal point
within the Department for DoD CI program implementation,
DoD CI resource planning, and DoD CI implementation
liaison with the NCIX staff, to include coordination
regarding NCIX decisions and functions regarding national
CI resource allocations.

6.2.5. Regarding budgetary matters:

6.2.5.1. Prepare and provide, together with, and pursuant
to, the policy guidance of the ASD(C3I) and submissions
from the Secretaries of the Military Departments, submissions
for the Department's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System (PPBS).

6.2.5.2. Prepare and provide, together with, and pursuant
to, the policy guidance of the ASD(C3I) and submissions
from the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the
Department's submissions to the Office of the Director
of Central Intelligence for the Director of Central
Intelligence Capabilities, Programming and Budgeting
System (CPBS) to provide resources for the Foreign Counterintelligence
Program in the National Foreign Intelligence Program,
the Defense Joint Counterintelligence Program in the
Joint Military Intelligence Program, and all other assigned
DoD CI programs and activities.

6.2.5.3. Support the ASD(C3I)'s presentation and justification
of DoD CI programs and budget throughout the PPBS process,
including representations before the Congress, for all
responsibilities and functions prescribed herein.

6.2.6. Develop, implement, and oversee DoD CI programs,
as assigned herein, using state-of-the-art Information
Technology (IT) whenever practicable, consistent with
mission requirements, and consulting with the CI offices
of the DoD Components to ensure the integrity of all
CI IT systems.

6.2.7. Develop and manage an integrated Defense CI
Program.

6.2.8. Develop and integrate the Defense CI Information
System (DCIIS) Program, including, but not limited to,
the architecture, software development, training, implementation,
and sustainment of the DCIIS while ensuring the architectural
integrity of the system.

6.2.9. Oversee Defense-wide CI investigations, operations,
and CI functional services, and:

6.2.9.1. Perform programmatic evaluations of the Department's
CI activities to determine the extent to which CI policies
and resources adequately protect the Department of Defense
against the threats of espionage, terrorism, sabotage,
assassination, and other covert or clandestine activities,
including those of foreign intelligence services.

6.2.9.2. Provide appropriate and timely access to all
relevant CI investigative and operational information
to designated senior DoD officials with CI responsibilities.

6.2.9.3. Provide timely advice and recommendations
to the ASD(C3I) and other senior DoD officials concerning
potential damage to DoD or national security that could
result from the compromise of classified or sensitive
information. Apprise appropriate policy makers of
such damage and notify them about any CI investigations
that have had, or could have, a significant impact on
the Department.

6.2.9.4. Facilitate the dissemination of relevant CI
and CI-related information to appropriate DoD personnel
who have a need-to-know.

6.2.9.5. Review and report to the ASD(C3I) any significant
developments regarding both initial and on-going CI
investigations and operations that affect DoD personnel
and resources, with particular emphasis on those investigations
and operations that have the potential to seriously
compromise critical Defense technologies, the Defense
Information Infrastructure, and current or near-term
military operations. Such reports shall address, where
appropriate, the steps that can be taken to minimize
the damage caused by the associated CI threat.

6.2.9.6. Recommend DoD policies and procedures that
maximize the integrity of on-going CI investigations
and operations within the Department.

6.2.10. Oversee the DoD CI Research and Technology
Protection (RTP) Program.

6.2.11. Conduct risk assessments in support of CI RTP,
DoD Critical Infrastructure Protection, DoD Force Protection,
and:

6.2.11.1. Provide course-of-action analyses, situational
awareness, and tailored product support to Heads of
the DoD Components and other senior officials, as appropriate.

6.2.11.2. Provide CI threat assessments and advisories,
risk assessments, and multimedia dissemination to the
Heads of the DoD Components.

6.2.11.3. Coordinate and integrate applicable RTP efforts
with Special Access Programs, through the OSD Special
Access Program Coordination Office (SAPCO).

6.2.11.4. Provide tailored analytical and data-mining
support to DoD CI field elements and activities of the
DoD Components, as appropriate, but, in particular,
to the Directors of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
the Defense Security Service, the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, and the National Security Agency, as well as
the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

6.2.11.5. Work within the larger DoD Intelligence Production
Program in coordination with the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, regarding the DoD CI Production Management Program.

6.2.11.6. Conduct Domestic Threat Analyses and Risk
Assessments in support of DoD Force Protection and DoD
Critical Infrastructure Protection efforts.

6.2.11.7. Conduct operational analysis in support of
DoD CI investigations and operations.

6.2.12. Identify and track technologies requiring protection.

6.2.13. Oversee the DoD CI Technology Horizontal Risk
Assessment and JCAG Threat Mapping processes and prepare
Technology and Target Profiles and Technology Risk Assessments.

6.2.14. Oversee and conduct advanced joint CI training
within the Department, and:

6.2.14.1. Exercise authority, direction, and control
over the DoD Joint CI Training Academy.

6.2.14.2. Develop and provide to the ASD(C3I) procedural
recommendations for CI training and professional development
within the Department.

6.2.15. Supervise and conduct the activities of the
DoD FPRG and in activities in support of the Combatant
Commanders, coordinate FPRG plans and operations with
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), as
necessary.

6.2.16. Oversee and conduct an advanced technology
development program in support of the Defense Counterintelligence
Program.

6.2.17. Carry out assigned functions and responsibilities
in subparagraphs 6.2.2. through 6.2.16. of this Directive
with the DoD CIFA operating as a law enforcement activity
within the Department of Defense pursuant to the authorities
vested in the Secretary of Defense in reference (a).
Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary or Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the law enforcement responsibilities
assigned by this Directive do not replace or supersede
those responsibilities currently assigned to the Defense
Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), the Army Criminal
Investigative Division, the Naval Criminal Investigative
Service, or the Air Force Office of Special Investigations
as Defense Criminal Investigative Organizations (DCIOs).
Accordingly, the DoD CIFA shall not engage in the
investigation, apprehension, or detention of individuals
suspected or convicted of criminal offenses against
the laws of the United States. For SAPs and SAP-related
investigations, the DCIS or the other DCIOs dedicated
to SAPs have investigative jurisdiction.

6.2.18. Handle all assigned functions and responsibilities
that affect DoD SAPs or SAP-related matters through
approved SAP offices, such as the OSD SAP Coordination
Office or the SAP Central Offices of the Military Departments.

6.3. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics) shall support the ASD(C3I) and the Director,
DoD CIFA, in taking necessary measures to require that
DoD Components with acquisition, technology, and logistics
responsibilities support the implementation of CI policies,
including those set forth in PDD/NSC-75 (reference (b))
and those intended to support the protection of DoD
research and technology as referenced in DoD Directive
5200.39 (reference (m)) and other related Departmental
issuances.

6.4. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:

6.4.1. Support the DoD CIFA in implementing PDD/NSC-75
(reference (b)) and integrating the Defense CI Program
DoD-wide and overseeing the appropriate functional aspects
of the program.

6.4.2. Report all significant CI activities, including
investigations and operations, to the Director, DoD
CIFA.

6.5. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall
provide combat-support guidance to the Director, DoD
CIFA, in coordination with the ASD(C3I), regarding the
FPRG.

6.6. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, shall
provide for the seamless integration of CI collection,
production, and joint-operations requirements management
with the activities managed and directed by the Director,
DoD CIFA. The Joint Staff/J2/CI shall coordinate all
joint-CI activities/requirements with the Director,
DoD CIFA, and shall coordinate all DoD CIFA-related
issues with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Combatant Commanders.

6.7. The Heads of the DoD Components shall:

6.7.1. Support the DoD CIFA on CI operational and implementation
matters and shall provide for the conduct, direction,
management, coordination, and control of CI activities
within their respective components, pursuant to DoD
Directive 5240.2 (reference (h)):

6.7.2. Report all significant CI activities regarding
the respective DoD Component, including investigations
and operations, to the DoD CIFA.

7. RELATIONSHIPS

7.1. In the performance of assigned duties, the Director,
DoD CIFA, shall:

7.1.1. Keep the DoD Components fully informed concerning
DoD CIFA activities with which they have collateral
or related functions.

7.1.2. Exchange information and advice as well as coordinate
actions with the DoD Components, as required, to carry
out assigned responsibilities and functions.

7.1.3. Use established facilities and services in the
Department of Defense and other Government Agencies,
whenever practicable, to avoid duplication and achieve
maximum efficiency and economy of operations.

7.1.4. Represent the Department of Defense and maintain
appropriate liaison, consultation, and coordination
with other governmental and non-governmental agencies
and CI organizations, as required, to exchange information
and advice on programs and activities in the fields
of assigned responsibility.

7.2. The Heads of the DoD Components shall coordinate
and consult with the Director, DoD CIFA, on matters
relating to DoD CIFA operations, functions, and responsibilities.

7.3. The OSD Special Access Program Coordination Office,
in coordination with the ASD(C3I) and the SAP Central
Offices of the Military Departments, shall be the point
of contact for all CI-related SAP issues.

8. AUTHORITIES

The Director, DoD CIFA, is specifically delegated the
authority to:

8.1. Obtain reports and information consistent with
DoD Directive 8910.1 (reference (n)), as necessary,
to carry out assigned functions.

8.2. Communicate directly with appropriate representatives
of the DoD Components, as necessary to carry out assigned
functions, including the transmission of requests for
advice and assistance. Communications to the Military
Departments shall be transmitted through the Secretaries
of the Military Departments, their designees, or as
otherwise provided in law or directed by the Secretary
of Defense in other DoD issuances. Communications
to the Commanders of the Combatant Commands shall be
transmitted by the ASD(C3I) through the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

8.3. Communicate with other Government officials, representatives
of the legislative branch, members of the public, and
representatives of foreign governments, as appropriate,
in carrying out assigned functions.

8.4. This Directive does not supersede any of the provisions
of DoD Directive O-5205.7 or DoD Overprint to the NISPOMSUP
(references (d) and (e)).

8.5. Exercise the administrative authorities in enclosure
2.

9. ADMINISTRATION

9.1. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall
assign military personnel to the DoD CIFA in accordance
with approved authorizations and established procedures
for assignment to joint duty.

9.2. Administrative support for the DoD CIFA shall
be provided by appropriate DoD Components through inter-Service
support agreements in accordance with DoD Instruction
4000.19 and DoD Directive 1400.16 (references (o) and
(p)).

10. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Directive is effective immediately.

Enclosures - 2

E1. References, continued

E2. Delegations of Authority

E1. ENCLOSURE 1

REFERENCES, continued

(e) Department of Defense Overprint to the National
Industrial Security Program Operating Manual Supplement,
January 14, 1998

(f) Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence
Activities," December 4, 1981

(g) DoD Directive 5137.1, "Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)
(ASD(C3I))," February 12, 1992

(h) DoD Directive 5240.2, "DoD Counterintelligence,"
May 22, 1997

(i) DoD Directive 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities,"
April 25, 1988

(j) DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities
of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States
Persons," December 1982

(k) Appendix 3 of title 5, United States Code, "Inspector
General Act of 1978," as amended

(l) DoD Directive 5200.27, "Acquisition of Information
Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated
with the Department of Defense," January 7, 1980

(m) DoD Directive 5200.39, "Security, Intelligence,
and Counterintelligence Support to Acquisition Program
Protection," September 10, 1997

(n) DoD Directive 8910.1, "Management and Control of
Information Requirements," June 11, 1993

(o) DoD Instruction 4000.19, "Interservice and Intragovernmental
Support," August 9, 1995

(p) DoD Directive 1400.16, "Inter-departmental Civilian
Personnel Administration Support," October 30, 1970

E2. ENCLOSURE 2

DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY

E2.1.1. Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary
of Defense, and subject to the authority, direction,
and control of the Secretary of Defense, the ASD(C3I),
and in accordance with DoD policies, Directives, and
Instructions, the Director, DoD CIFA, or in the absence
of the Director, the person acting for the Director,
is delegated authority, as required, in the administration
and operation of the DoD CIFA to:

E2.1.1.1. Perform the following functions in accordance
with Executive Order 10450, Executive Order 12333, Executive
Order 12968, and DoD Directive 5200.2, as appropriate,
to:

E2.1.1.1.1. Designate any position in DoD CIFA as a
"sensitive" position.

E2.1.1.1.2. Authorize, in case of emergency, the appointment
of a person to a sensitive position in the DoD CIFA
for a limited period of time and for whom a full field
investigation or other appropriate investigation, including
National Agency Check, has not been completed.

E2.1.1.1.3. Authorize the suspension, but not terminate
the services of, a DoD CIFA employee in the interest
of national security.

E2.1.1.2. Authorize and approve:

E2.1.1.2.1. Temporary duty travel for military personnel
assigned or detailed to the DoD CIFA in accordance with
Joint Federal Travel Regulations, Volume 1.

E2.1.1.2.2. Travel for DoD CIFA civilian employees
in accordance with Joint Travel Regulations, Volume
2.

E2.1.1.2.3. Invitational travel to non-DoD employees
whose consultative, advisory, or other highly specialized
technical service are required in a capacity that is
directly related to, or in connection with, DoD CIFA
activities, in accordance with Volume 2, Joint Travel
Regulations.

E2.1.1.2.4. Overtime work for DoD CIFA civilian employees
in accordance with 5 U.S.C. Chapter 55, Subpart V, and
applicable Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulations.

E2.1.1.2.5. Approve the expenditure of funds available
for travel by military personnel assigned or detailed
to the DoD CIFA for expenses incident to attendance
at meetings of technical, scientific, professional,
or other similar organizations in such instances where
the approval of the Secretary of Defense, or designee,
is required by 37 U.S.C. 412, and 5 U.S.C. 4110 and
4111.

E2.1.1.2.6. Develop, establish, and maintain an active
and continuing Records Management Program, pursuant
to 44 U.S.C. 3102 and DoD Directive 5015.2.

E.2.1.1.2.7. Authorize the publication of advertisements,
notices, proposals, or other public periodicals, as
required for the effective administration of DoD CIFA,
consistent with 33 U.S.C. 3702.

E2.1.1.2.8. Establish and maintain, for the functions
assigned, an appropriate publications system for the
promulgation of Directives, Instructions, Publications,
and reference documents, and changes thereto, pursuant
to the policies and procedures prescribed in DoD 5025.1-M.

E2.1.1.2.9. Enter into support and services agreements
with the Military Departments, other DoD Components,
or other Government Agencies, as required, for the effective
and efficient performance of DoD CIFA responsibilities
and functions.

E2.1.1.2.10. Enter into and administer contracts directly
or through a Military Department, a DoD contract administration
services component, or other Government Department or
Agency, as appropriate, for supplies, equipment, and
services required to accomplish the mission of DoD CIFA.
To the extent that any law or Executive order specifically
limits the exercise of such authority to persons at
the Secretarial level of a Military Department, such
authority will be exercised by the appropriate Under
Secretary or Assistant Secretary of Defense.

E2.1.1.3. The Director, DoD CIFA, may redelegate these
authorities, as appropriate and in writing, except as
otherwise specifically indicated above or as otherwise
provided by law or regulation.


Military Intelligence use coercive tactics 28.Nov.2005 10:02

Army Vet.

The military uses tactics which disregard legal rights. In the 1980's a Military Intelligence officer or spy was assigned to my unit in Texas. His job was to find out who was using drugs. The military was trying to clean up thier image and get out the pot smokers. The last name the M.I. officer went by was Friend, not his real name. He encouraged fellow soldgiers to come to parties at his apartment off base. He suppled plenty of alcohol and when most everyone was drunk he brought out his stash of pot and aggressively tried to get people to smoke it with him. Some soldiers did. I didn't because I didn't want an Article 15 for having a dirty U.A.. We had a number of people in our unit with security clearances and these were the people he targeted.
If the military considers something a matter of national security they will infiltrate groups and try to get the groups involved with something illegal. Then they will turn around and prosocute members of that group for crimes they set up.
When the crimes becomes blurry things like espionage simply repeating a comment heard can be used to blackmail people into creating false allegations against people they know.

Where are we going in this hand basket? 28.Nov.2005 10:57

afraid to say

Just when you think they have already taken all your rights you find out we have more to loose. Well I guess we shouldn't worry too much the U.S. Army has done a wonderful job of protecting Iraq from abuse of power and stopping terrorism right?
How long will this country pretend we are a nation of laws?
When will the slide toward facism stop?
Does anyone know how to properly goose step?

Deployed in the U.S.A.:The Creeping Militarization of the Home Front 28.Nov.2005 11:26

Gene Healy

The U.S. military is the most effective fighting force in human history. It is so effective, in fact, that many government officials are now anxious for the military to assume a more active policing role here at home.

Deploying troops on the home front is very different from waging war abroad. Soldiers are trained to kill, whereas civilian peace officers are trained to respect constitutional rights and to use force only as a last resort. That fundamental distinction explains why Americans have long resisted the use of standing armies to keep the domestic peace.

Unfortunately, plans are afoot to change that time-honored policy. There have already been temporary troop deployments in the airports and on the Canadian and Mexican borders and calls to make border militarization permanent. The Pentagon has also shown a disturbing interest in high-tech surveillance of American citizens. And key figures in the Bush administration and Congress have considered weakening the Posse Comitatus Act, the federal statute that limits the government's ability to use the military for domestic police work.

The historical record of military involvement in domestic affairs cautions against a more active military presence in the American homeland. If Congress weakens the legal barriers to using soldiers as cops, substantial collateral damage to civilian life and liberty will likely ensue.

The plan is simple... 28.Nov.2005 11:52

Pravda or Consequences

Take the work of other tryants (delude yourself into thinking that you would use the power for "good") and relable it as 'security with safeguards'.

The amount of fear generated by Washington DC and the acquience by the loyal opposition means that short of a revolution, we are on our way to a life of control just for the perception of 'freedom'.

I think this would be a good time to start getting focused on what we can build to deflect the coming dark ages.

.. 28.Nov.2005 12:01

anti-imperialist

When are we going to face the fact that these laws are coming on the heels of the anti-corporate/anti-globalization movement. None of these encroaching laws against privacy were heard of before we came to power. We have to assume that the Patriot Act, et al are occuring due to our existance.

Defense Security Service accepting bids 28.Nov.2005 12:04

web rat

Many Defense contractors are chomping at the bit to get at prospective CIFA dollars if the contract is expanded. The Defense Security Service already has processes in place to apply for various counterintelligence, espionage, law-enforcement and security training opportunities.


"The Defense Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) is a transformation initiative created to lead the development of a "to-the-edge" counterintelligence system for the Department of Defense. Its mission is to produce a common Defense Department counterintelligence operational picture, and deliver unique and actionable information to key decision makers in federal, state and local governments.

This common counterintelligence system will serve the Defense Department's senior leaders; the Joint Staff; the war fighters; the research, development and acquisition community; agents in the field; and various federal agencies responsible for intelligence gathering, counterintelligence, counterespionage, anti-terrorism, law enforcement and security.

Worldwide, more than 400 civilian and military employees work for CIFA with the ultimate goal of detecting and neutralizing the many different forms of espionage regularly conducted against the United States by terrorists, foreign intelligence services and other covert and clandestine groups.

The threats posed by these adversaries include actions to kill or harm U.S. citizens; to steal critical information or assets (military or civilian); or destroy critical infrastructures.

As part of its comprehensive counterintelligence system, CIFA also holds advanced training and education for counterintelligence, counterespionage and anti-terrorism professionals throughout the federal government."

Maybe a plan to take power from FBI and CIA (seems to be black budget) 28.Nov.2005 12:24

web rat

Many Defense contractors are chomping at the bit to get at prospective CIFA dollars if the contract is expanded. The Defense Security Service already has processes in place to apply for various counterintelligence, espionage, law-enforcement and security training.


"The Defense Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) is a transformation initiative created to lead the development of a "to-the-edge" counterintelligence system for the Department of Defense. Its mission is to produce a common Defense Department counterintelligence operational picture, and deliver unique and actionable information to key decision makers in federal, state and local governments.

This common counterintelligence system will serve the Defense Department's senior leaders; the Joint Staff; the war fighters; the research, development and acquisition community; agents in the field; and various federal agencies responsible for intelligence gathering, counterintelligence, counterespionage, anti-terrorism, law enforcement and security.

Worldwide, more than 400 civilian and military employees work for CIFA with the ultimate goal of detecting and neutralizing the many different forms of espionage regularly conducted against the United States by terrorists, foreign intelligence services and other covert and clandestine groups.

The threats posed by these adversaries include actions to kill or harm U.S. citizens; to steal critical information or assets (military or civilian); or destroy critical infrastructures.

As part of its comprehensive counterintelligence system, CIFA also holds advanced training and education for counterintelligence, counterespionage and anti-terrorism professionals throughout the federal government."

CIFA apparently has no publicly accessible website, but that doesn't mean there is no information. While I can't find a direct link, I suspect that CIFA operates out of the Defense Security Service under its Counterintelligence Unit - but I could be wrong. According to a September 2003Report to Congress on The Role of the Department of Defense in Supporting Homeland Security, one of the restructurings of the Department of Defense was to add an Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. According to the report:

Key to the mission of DoD's Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) is identification and tracking of terrorists and production of CI threat assessments and advisories and risk assessments in support of DoD force protection and critical infrastructure protection efforts, and tailored analytical and data-mining support to DoD CI field elements and agencies and the Service secretaries. These "knowledge products" provide a foundation for actions that can be taken to mitigate risks and enhance the security of U.S. persons, and critical operations, resources, and technologies. Central to CIFA operations is close collaboration and partnering with other organizations in the national intelligence and investigative community. CIFA is now furnishing a counterintelligence support team to assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)-led Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force and is orchestrating the permanent assignment of DoD law enforcement and counterintelligence agents and analysts to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces throughout the United States. These personnel will collect and analyze terrorist threat and criminal information and participate in the investigation of international terrorist incidents having a DoD link.
The report goes on to state: "CIFA has a significant role to play, given its unique tools, technology, data exploitation capabilities, and experience in identifying previously unknown or suspected terrorists." Further, that there will be twenty CIFA detachments located around the world.

This scope if the mission of CIFA seems to indicate a budgetary need in excess of the 2003 reporting of $470,000. It is suspicious that there is no budget for 2004 and 2005. Has CIFA gone "dark?" It seems likely to me. According to this this defense budget link which lists the 2002 budget at $654,000; 2003 at $470,000 and nothing for 2004 and 2005 (DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE Fiscal Year (FY) 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates Exhibit R-1, RDT&E Programs).

As is noted from the Defense Security Polygraph Page:

Counterintelligence to the Edge
The Defense Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) is a transformation initiative created to lead the development of a "to-the-edge" counterintelligence system for the Department of Defense. Its mission is to produce a common Defense Department counterintelligence operational picture, and deliver unique and actionable information to key decision makers in federal, state and local governments.

This common counterintelligence system will serve the Defense Department's senior leaders; the Joint Staff; the war fighters; the research, development and acquisition community; agents in the field; and various federal agencies responsible for intelligence gathering, counterintelligence, counterespionage, anti-terrorism, law enforcement and security.

Worldwide, more than 400 civilian and military employees work for CIFA with the ultimate goal of detecting and neutralizing the many different forms of espionage regularly conducted against the United States by terrorists, foreign intelligence services and other covert and clandestine groups.

The threats posed by these adversaries include actions to kill or harm U.S. citizens; to steal critical information or assets (military or civilian); or destroy critical infrastructures.

As part of its comprehensive counterintelligence system, CIFA also holds advanced training and education for counterintelligence, counterespionage and anti-terrorism professionals throughout the federal government.


As has been noted by others writing about CIFA (Wall Street Journal 3/9/04 Is Military Creeping Into Domestic Law Enforcement?; Secrecy News - "DRASTIC" CHANGES SEEN IN DOMESTIC MILITARY OPERATIONS; LA Times 9/23/03 Mission Creep Hits Home) this move into domestic areas is not only questionable, but alarming. It does however fit with more recent moves by Rumsfeld to steal intelligence functions from the FBI and CIA. Maybe the creation of CIFA was among the first moves in that longer term plan.

More info about CIFA 28.Nov.2005 13:49

Man on the street

DOD oversight of CIFA


Department of Defense

INSTRUCTION



NUMBER 5240.16
May 21, 2005


USD(I)

SUBJECT: DoD Counterintelligence Functional Services

References: (a) DoD Directive 5240.2, "DoD Counterintelligence (CI)," May 22, 1997
(b) DoD Directive 5105.67, "Department of Defense Counterintelligence Field
Activity," February 19, 2002
(c) DoD Instruction 5240.4, "Reporting of Counterintelligence and Criminal
Violations," September 22, 1992
(d) DoD Instruction 5240.6, "Counterintelligence (CI) Awareness, Briefing and
Reporting Programs," August 7, 2004


1. PURPOSE

This Instruction assigns responsibilities and prescribes procedures pursuant to reference (a) for
the conduct of Counterintelligence (CI) Functional Services within the Department of Defense.


2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

This Instruction applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military
Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the DoD
Inspector General Office, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other
organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as "the
DoD Components").


3. DEFINITIONS

Terms used in this Instruction are defined in enclosure 1.
DoDI 5240.16, May 21, 2005

4. POLICY

This Instruction implements policy established in reference (a).


5. RESPONSIBILITIES

5.1. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) shall approve policy
implementation guidance and procedures pursuant to reference (a).

5.1.1. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence and Security
(DUSD(CI&S)), under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I), shall:

5.1.1.1. Serve as the principal advisor to the USD(I) on DoD CI Functional Services
and related matters.

5.1.1.2. Oversee and sustain activities that comprise DoD CI Functional Services.

5.1.2. The Director, Counterintelligence, under the DUSD(CI&S), shall:

5.1.2.1. Develop and recommend policy for CI Functional Services.

5.1.2.2. Provide OSD-level oversight for CI Functional Services.

5.1.2.3. Participate and represent OSD in DoD and national-level policy boards,
working groups, and committees related to CI Functional Services.

5.1.3. The Director, Department of Defense Counterintelligence Field Activity (DoD
CIFA), under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I), shall:

5.1.3.1. Serve as CI program manager pursuant to DoD Directive 5105.67 (reference
(b)).

5.1.3.2. Provide specialized Functional Services training to Component CI personnel.

5.1.3.3. Develop and recommend processes, procedures and tools to enhance the
standardization and quality of CI Functional Services activities.

5.2. The Heads of the DoD Components shall:

5.2.1. Establish, resource, and manage CI Functional Services, pursuant to the CI
authorities assigned in reference (a).

5.2.2. Manage and oversee the use of CI resources funded for CI Functional Services.

DoDI 5240.16, May 21, 2005

5.2.3. Integrate the CI support provided under CI Functional Services into Component
planning and mission activities.

5.2.4. Ensure CI personnel attend basic and advanced CI training courses related to CI
Functional Services.

5.2.5. Provide CI Functional Services performance measures and other data requested by
the Director, Counterintelligence, and DoD CIFA.

5.2.6. Ensure that all significant CI activity is reported to DoD CIFA pursuant to DoD
Instruction 5240.4 (reference (c)).


6. PROCEDURES

6.1. The DoD Component CI organizations are authorized to conduct CI Functional
Services, consistent with the DoD Component's assigned CI mission and authorities.

6.2. CI Functional Services are applicable to one or more of the CI missions and shall
include:

6.2.1. CI briefing and debriefing programs focused on the CI program, counterespionage
and antiterrorism in accordance with DoD Instruction 5240.6 (reference (d)).

6.2.2. Debriefings of DoD personnel who are reporting information concerning potential
treason, spying, espionage, sabotage, terrorism, subversion, sedition, related foreign intelligence
activities, and other suspicious matters of possible CI interest in accordance with reference (d).

6.2.3. CI activities conducted in support of Service, Joint, and combined military
operations and training exercises.

6.2.4. CI activities conducted pursuant to the CI missions to support Critical
Infrastructure Protection and Research and Technology Protection, which are not covered by the
other CI functions (CI investigations, CI operations, CI collection, and CI analysis).

6.2.5. CI support to counter-proliferation and countering weapons of mass destruction
activities.

6.2.6. CI activities in support of force protection, to include participation in CI surveys
and vulnerability assessments and surveillance detection. Activities covered by the other CI
functions, and protective service operations, are excluded from this category.

6.2.7. Defensive CI programs and initiatives, aimed at identifying potential espionage or
terrorist activity.

DoDI 5240.16, May 21, 2005

6.2.8. CI activities conducted in support of Arms Control Treaties.

6.2.9. CI resources assigned to CI Staff Officer positions and offices at Combatant
Commands and other major Joint organizations.

6.2.10. CI activities conducted in support of Human Intelligence.

6.2.11. Specialized CI activities not covered by the other CI functions, including:

6.2.11.1. Polygraph/Credibility Assessment services.

6.2.11.2. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures and related technical services.

6.2.11.3. Behavioral sciences.

6.2.11.4. Cyber services, including but not limited to, digital forensics and cyber
vulnerability assessments.


7. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Instruction is effective immediately.



Enclosure
E1. Definitions
DoDI 5240.16, May 21, 2005
E1. ENCLOSURE 1

DEFINITIONS

E1.1. DEFINED TERMS

E1.1.1. CI Missions. DoD CI responsibilities to support force protection, DoD research and technology protection, infrastructure protection, and information and capabilities protection.

E1.1.2. Counter-proliferation. DoD activities to combat proliferation, including diplomacy, arms control, export controls, and intelligence collection and analysis, with particular responsibility for assuring U.S. forces and interests can be protected should they confront an adversary armed with missiles or weapons of mass destruction.

E1.1.3. Functional Services. CI activities that support other intelligence or DoD operational activities, providing specialized defensive CI services to identity and counter terrorism, espionage, sabotage and related activities of foreign intelligence services.

E1.1.4. Weapons of Mass Destruction. Any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; a disease organism; or radiation or radioactivity.

DCIFA 01

System name:

CIFA Operational and Analytical Records (February 25, 2005, 70 FR 9281).

System location:

Counterintelligence Field Activity, 251 18th Street, Suite 1200, Arlington, VA, 22202-3537.

Categories of individuals covered by the system:

Individuals involved in, or of interest to, DoD counterintelligence or law enforcement investigations, operations, or analytical projects.

Categories of records in the system:

Records relating to the management of the DoD counterintelligence system and the coordination of DoD counterintelligence activities. Records relating to analytical or operational support for DoD counterintelligence, force protection, critical infrastructure protection, research and technology protection, threat analysis, and risk assessments. Records relating to the architecture and operation of DoD counterintelligence information systems. Reports of investigation, collection reports, statements of individuals, affidavits, correspondence, and other documentation pertaining to investigative or analytical efforts by DoD and other U.S. government agencies to identify or counter foreign intelligence and terrorist threats to the DoD and the United States. The system of records includes ad hoc or temporary databases established to support particular investigations, task forces, or analytical projects.

Authority for maintenance of the system:

10 U.S.C. 113, Secretary of Defense; 5 U.S.C. 301, Departmental Regulations; Executive OrderE.O. 12,333, United States Intelligence Activities,() as amended by E.O. 13284 and E.O. 13355, Amendment of Executive Orders, and Other Actions, in Connection With the Establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and; DoD Directive 5105.67, Department of Defense Counterintelligence Field Activity (DoD CIFA)(; and E.O. 9397 (SSN)).

Purpose(s):

Compiled for use by the Counterintelligence Field Activity in the development and management of DoD counterintelligence programs and functions that support the protection of DoD, including counterintelligence support to protect DoD personnel, resources, critical information, research and development programs, technology, critical infrastructure, and U.S. interests against the activities of foreign powers and terrorist groups.

Routine uses of records maintained in the system, including categories of users and the purposes of such uses:

In addition to those disclosures generally permitted under 5 U.S.C. 552a(b) of the Privacy Act, these records or information contained therein may specifically be disclosed outside the DoD as a routine use pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(b)(3) as follows:

To the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Homeland Security and other Executive Branch intelligence, counterintelligence, law enforcement, or security agencies to assist them in matters within their jurisdiction pertaining to hostile foreign intelligence or terrorist activities.

The DoD 'Blanket Routine Uses' set forth at the beginning of OSD's compilation of systems of records notices apply to this system.

Policies and practices for storing, retrieving, accessing, retaining, and disposing of records in the system:

Storage:

Maintained in paper files and on electronic media.

Retrievability:

Retrieved by name, Social Security Number, and or other personal identifiers.

Safeguards:

Records are maintained in a controlled facility. Physical entry is restricted by the use of locks, guards, and is accessible only to authorized personnel. Access to records is limited to person(s) responsible for servicing the record in performance of their official duties and who are properly screened and cleared for need to know. Access to computerized data is restricted by passwords, which are changed periodically.

Retention and disposal:

Disposition pending (until the National Archives and Records Administration approves the retention and disposition of these records, treat as permanent).

System manager(s) and address:

Chief Information Officer, Counterintelligence Field Activity, 251 18th Street, Suite 1200, Arlington, VA, 22202-3537.

Notification procedure:

Individuals seeking to determine whether information about themselves is contained in this system of records should address written inquiries to the Privacy and Freedom of Information Coordinator, Counterintelligence Field Activity, 251 18th Street, Suite 1200, Arlington, VA, 22202-3537.

Requests should contain the individual's name, date of birth, sufficient information to determine the type of records being sought, and the approximate date the records might have been created.

Record access procedures:

Individuals seeking access to information about themselves contained in this system of records should address written inquiries to the Privacy and Freedom of Information Coordinator, Counterintelligence Field Activity, 251 18th Street, Suite 1200, Arlington, VA, 22202-3537.

Requests should contain the individual's name, date of birth, sufficient information to determine the type of records being sought, and the approximate date the records might have been created.

Contesting record procedures:

The OSD rules for accessing records, for contesting contents and appealing initial agency determinations are published in OSD Administrative Instruction 81; 32 CFR part 311; or may be obtained from the system manager.

Record source categories:

Investigative, operational, and/or analytical files of DoD and other federal agencies with counterintelligence, intelligence, law enforcement, security, protective, or related responsibilities. Information collected by CIFA from public or commercial sources in compliance with DoD authorities.

Exemptions claimed for the system:

This system of records is a compilation of information from other Department of Defense and U.S. Government systems of records. To the extent that copies of exempt records from those 'other' systems of records are entered into DCIFA 01, OSD hereby claims the same exemptions for the records from those 'other' systems that are entered into this system, as claimed for the original primary system of which they are a part.

An exemption rule for this system has been promulgated in accordance with requirements of 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(1), (2), and (3), (c) and (e) and published in 32 CFR part 311. For additional information contact the system manager.

Planning the future of a fascist regime 28.Nov.2005 14:28

*


I Wanna Be A Spy 29.Nov.2005 08:02

anon

(Haven't we been here before?)

 http://www.folkmusic.com/record/r_chief.htm

John McCutcheon
Hail to the Chief!
(and other short shelf-life classics)

Ashcroft's Army (2002)
words and music by John McCutcheon

Operation TIPS! Sign me up! I wanna be a spy!

I saw him on TV last night
In a suit of somber blue
He said it was time for all Americans
To do what we must do
Take out your x-ray glasses
And your decoder rings
We need ordinary people
To keep an eye on things

So...

I wanna be in Ashcroft's Army
I wanna be a spy
I wanna watch my neighbor's doings
Kiss your rights goodbye
In this legal devolution
A perfect chance for retribution
Let's just can the Constitution
I wanna be a spy

I wanna be in Ashcroft's Army
I wanna be a fed
I might look like the meter man
But I'm a spook instead
Delivering pizza or the mail
Buddy, you can never tell
I'll haul your sorry ass to jail
I wanna be a spy

I wanna be in Ashcroft's Army
I wanna be a sleuth
I wanna catch some terrorists
Don't worry 'bout the truth
If I see you hanging 'round
Wearin' a turban and your skin is brown
You're gonna take a ride downtown
I wanna be a spy

I wanna be in Ashcroft's Army
I'm gonna be a mole
It's time to show the rest or my neighbors
Just who's in control
The Vice-President said, "Shame on you!"
The Attorney General said it too
"Don't you question what we do!"
I wanna be a spy

I wanna be in Ashcroft's Army
I wanna a G-Man
He used to be a Senator
But now he is a free man
He's a Attorney General instead
'Cause the people of Missouri said
"We'd rather vote for a guy who's dead!"
I wanna be a spy

I wanna be in Ashcroft's Army
But still I've gotta wonder
Where was all this spying
When Adelphia went under
When Enron ran off with the loot
And Worldcom went right down the chute
Some terrorists wear pin-striped suits
I wanna be a spy

Charlottesville, VA August, 2002

2002 John McCutcheon/Appalsongs (ASCAP)

One World, One Currency, One Government = No Liberty 30.Nov.2005 16:55

John Ledford tracey12_12_12@yahoo.com

As the glove tightens around you neck, you may be wondering just why this is taking place.

The greatest coup in history has begun.

Europeans bought the plan when they became the EU. Americans will soon follow the borderless concept. Asia is all that remains after the America's unite under one flag, one currency and one central government. Pax America, Pan America, The Plan, and other names are given to this massive power grab brought about by government/corporations/media giants.

We in America will soon be told that immigration control is no longer functional. It must then be replaced by a new concept: the free flow of documented people over borders. Hence, President Bush's new "worker program" that unites the non-American looking for a job in the USA with an employer. Yet this is all smoke and mirrors deception. The goal is to begin a slow process of border removal by allowing the an increasing amount of people and business over the border to cross the border until enforcing and protecting our border is impossible. NAFTA, CAFTA, and the coming south american agreement are all designed to disolve borders through trade just as the MASTRICHT Treaty did in Europe. It was the tool used by globalists to begin the breakdown of borders between member nations. So it will go in the America's and then in Asia.

Tri-Lateral

Three continents aligned under the control of a small group of so called leaders who have in their minds and hearts a true conviction that they've been given, by some force in the universe, the moral authority to rule over the earth. This is not made up. Bill Clinton made similar remarks as have others who believe that they are the men of this era who will finally end all wars, all famine through forced wealth redistribution. This coup has already begun. It is well under way, and few Americans even realize that their ship of liberty has been boarded and hijacked by pirates, and its course changed.

Tracey