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9.11 investigation

The Cleveland Airport Mystery

Mysteries about grounded flights on Sep11th, in connection with the hijack-flight numbers
The Cleveland Airport Mystery
INN World Report -May 30


WoodyBox ("Flight 11 - The Twin Flight") new article is yet another groundbreaking analysis. It appears, that the majority of 9/11 Researchers and the 9/11 family members, who lost their loved ones, have to compile a new list of questions about an airport, which didn't receive much attention yet: Cleveland Hopkins, Ohio. Among the disturbing new details are two flights, which apparently had been part of yet another "mirror flight" scenario. "Both" got grounded in Ohio. One of them was Delta1989, the other one was identified as, most shocking: "Flight 93"! But there are also many new questions about some "200 passengers" of that day...

The Cleveland Airport Mystery

200 passengers got lost on 9/11 - by Woody Box

Exclusive for INN Report -May 30

Inmidst the chaos breaking out in the hours after the WTC and Pentagon attacks, between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m an airplane made an emergency landing at Cleveland Hopkins Airport . Rumours were going around that it was hijacked or had a bomb on board. The FBI evacuated the plane and searched it with bomb-sniffing dogs after the passengers had left. It turned out to be false alarm. The plane - Delta flight1989 - was not hijacked, and there was no bomb.

However, a closer examination reveals a bunch of conflicting statements concerning Delta 1989. Neither the moment of landing, nor the number of the passengers, nor the location of the grounded plane is clear. For every aspect of the incident there are two different versions. Not one or three or four versions, but two.

This article will prove that not one, but two planes made an emergency landing in Cleveland - in close succession. The proof is based on local newspaper and radio reports from September 11th and 12th (mainly from the Akron Beacon Journal and the Cleveland Plain Dealer), statements of eyewitnesses and internet postings in the morning of 9/11 (people were listening to the radio and immediately submitted the breaking news to the net). One of the flights was indeed Delta 1989. We don't know the identity of the other one, so we call it "Flight X"...

more at INN

COL. SCOTT assoc. w/ NORAD's Amalgam Virgo scenario, pre-9-11 31.May.2004 20:22


WHO THE HELL IS THIS RETIRED NORAD ASSOCIATED COL. ALAN SCOTT? IN THE ABOVE ARTICLE BY WOODY BOX, HE SEEMS TO BE CRAFTING A COVER STORY IN MY OPINION FOR THE RECORD THAT ENTIRELY IS AT ODDS WITH WHAT WAS GOING ON AT CLEVELAND. More information about Col. Clark shows that he was involved with NORAD's simultaneous hijacking scenario planning...He claims he was "uninvolved" with the one going down on 9-11, though he was INVOLVED WITH EARLIER VERSIONS OF THE SIMULTANEOUS HIJACK SCENARIOS WITHIN NORAD. Read the bit about Col. Scott at the above article by Woody Box. Then get this background about Col. Scott from the below.

This is from the 9-11 "testimony":

Public Hearing Friday, May 23, 2003 Hart Senate Office Building Room 216 Washington, DC


. . .

MR. BEN-VENISTE: Was not this information, sir, available to NORAD as of September 11th, 2001?

GEN. MCKINLEY: It's obvious by your categorization that those events all took place and that NORAD had that information. I would only add, sir, that the intelligence data that we postured our forces for and the training and the tactics and the procedures that we used to prepare our missions for support of the combatant commander of NORAD had hijacking as a primary intercept tactic. And we have some of the finest fighter pilots, as you know in the world, who are some of the best people in the world who can do their mission extremely well. But we had not postured prior to September 11th, 2001, for the scenario that took place that day.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: Well, obviously it would be hard to imagine posturing for the exact scenario. But isn't it a fact, sir, that prior to September 11th, 2001, NORAD had already in the works plans to simulate in an exercise a simultaneous hijacking of two planes in the United States?

GEN. MCKINLEY: Colonel Scott, do you have any data on that? I'm not aware of that, sir. I was not present at the time.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: That was Operation Amalgam Virgo.

MR. SCOTT: Yes, sir. Specifically Operation Amalgam Virgo, which I was involved in before I retired, was a scenario using a Third World united -- not united -- uninhabited aerial vehicle launched off a rogue freighter in the Gulf of Mexico. General Arnold can back me up -- at the time one of our greatest concerns was the proliferation of cruise missile technology and the ability for terrorist groups to get that technology, get it close enough to our shores to launch it. In fact, this exercise -- in this exercise we used actual drone -- NQM-107 drones, which are about the size of a cruise missile, to exercise our fighters and our radars in a Gulf of Mexico scenario.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: You are referring to Amalgam 01, are you not?

MR. SCOTT: Yes, sir, Amalgam 01.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: I am referring to Amalgam 02, which was in the planning stages prior to September 11th, 2001, sir. Is that correct?

MR. SCOTT: That was after I retired, and I was not involved in 02. [ESCAPE FROM THE QUESTION]

MR. BEN-VENISTE: Will you accept that the exercise involved a simultaneous hijacking scenario?


GEN. MCKINLEY: [RESCUING SCOTT FROM QUESTIONING] Sir, I do have some information on 02, if you would allow me to read it for the record.


GEN. MCKINLEY: Amalgam Virgo in general, 02, was an exercise created to focus on peacetime and contingency NORAD missions. One of the peacetime scenarios that is and has been a NORAD mission for years is support to other government departments. Within this mission falls hijackings. Creativity of the designer aside, prior to 9/11, hijack motivations were based on political objectives -- i.e., asylum or release of captured prisoners or political figures. Threats of killing hostages or crashing were left to the script writers to invoke creativity and broaden the required response for players.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: Well, isn't that a bit fatuous given the specific information that I've given you? It wasn't in the minds of script writers when the Algerians had actually hijacked the plane, which they were attempting to fly into the Eiffel Tower. And all of the other scenarios which I mentioned to you. I don't mean to argue with you. But my question is, sir, given the awareness of the terrorists use of planes as weapons, how is it that NORAD was still focusing outward protecting the United States against attacks from the Soviet Union or elsewhere, and was not better prepared to defend against the hijacking scenarios of a commercial jet laden with fuel used as a weapon to target citizens of the United States? When you say our training was vestigial, I think you said it in capsulated form. But would you agree that on the basis of the information available that there could be, could have been better preparedness by NORAD to meet this threat?

GEN. MCKINLEY: In retrospect, sir, I think I would agree with your comment.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: With respect to the bases that were available for protecting the East Coast, you -- and Colonel Scott has gone through the scrambling of aircraft -- I wanted to focus just on one flight, Flight 77, and then Secretary Lehman will ask you some more specific questions. With respect to Flight 77, sir, you testified previously before the House Armed Services Committee, and General Eberhardt was questioned -- you are familiar with his testimony?

GEN. MCKINLEY: Yes, sir.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: Okay. He was questioned about Flight 77, and because of the use of Langley Air Base, which is 105 miles from our capital, as opposed to, say, Andrews Air Force Base, which is in the neighborhood, the question arises again about the positioning and the thought behind the positioning of fighter planes to protect our capital in an enhanced terrorist situation such as existed on September 10th, September 9th, 2002.

Let me ask you about Flight 77 again. The question was the timeline we have been given is that at 8:55 on September 11th American Airlines Flight 77 began turning east away from its intended course, and at 9:10 Flight 77 was detected by the FAA radar over West Virginia heading east. That was after the two planes struck the Trade Center towers. Is that correct, Colonel Scott?

MR. SCOTT: Yes, sir.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: Now, 15 minutes later, at 9:25, the FAA notified NORAD, according to this statement, that Flight 77 was headed toward Washington. Was that the first notification, 9:25, that NORAD or DOD had that Flight 77 was probably hijacked? And, if it was, do you know why it took 15 minutes for FAA to notify NORAD? General Eberhardt said, "Sir, there's one minor difference: I saw it as 9:24, which you do as well, that we were notified, and that's the first notification we received." "Do you know if that was the first notification to DOD?" "Yes, sir, that's the first documented notification that we received." And I want to focus on the word "documented," because it's very important for us to know when NORAD actually received notification, given the fact that planes had already crashed into the World Trade Center, and given I am sure the assumption that these were terrorist acts and there could be more coming, more planes coming.

Is it in fact correct, sir, that the first notification of any type that NORAD received was not until 9:24 with respect to Flight 77?

GEN. MCKINLEY: With your concurrence, sir, I would like to ask General Arnold to address that. He was on the floor that morning.

GEN. ARNOLD: Thank you. The simple answer to your question is I believe that to be a fact: that 9:24 was the first time that we had been advised of American 77 as a possible hijacked airplane. Our focus -- you have got to remember that there's a lot of other things going on simultaneously here, was on United 93, which was being pointed out to us very aggressively I might say by the FAA. Because our radars looking outward and not inward, the only way for us to know where anything was was for the FAA to pass along that information to us.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: Well, is it not the case, General Arnold, that there was an open line established between FAA, NORAD and other agencies, including CIA and FBI, that morning?

GEN. ARNOLD: Well, I wasn't on that line at that particular time if that were the case. In fact, there is an open line established between our sectors at really the tactical level where they are controlling the aircraft talking to the FAA controllers from time to time. We did not have an open line at that time with the FAA. That is not accurate.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: You did not. You were not -- NORAD was not in contact --

GEN. ARNOLD: The continental United States NORAD region, my headquarters, responsible for the continental United States air defense, did not have an open line with the FAA at that time.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: Was there some NORAD office that had an open line with the FAA --


MR. BEN-VENISTE: Excuse me. Let me finish my question, please. Was there some NORAD office -- and you'll forgive us because we had asked for this information prior to the hearing from FAA and did not receive it -- but we are advised that there was indeed an open line between either the net or some other name given to a -- essentially an ongoing conference where under, in real time, FAA was providing information as it received it, immediately after the first crash into the Towers, we were told, with respect to each of the events that were ongoing of any remarkable nature? I see General McKinley is nodding.

GEN. MCKINLEY: I'd like to, if I may, address this, based on my research and review for this commission. It's my understanding that the FAA was in contact with our Northeast Air Defense Sector at Rome, New York. Understanding the relationship of how we defend North America from threats, NORAD located in Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, our continental NORAD region, our air operations center located at Tindel Air Force Base in Florida -- that's where the joint force air component commander resides. And then we have three sectors based on the size and volume of our country that handle that. It is my understanding from talking with both FAA and our supervisors at the Northeast Air Defense Sector in Rome, that those lines were open and that they were discussing these issues.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: So, is it fair to say that at least the NORAD personnel in Rome, New York, had information available to it in real time once it saw -- and we were advised that this occurred at 9:02, which was then 22 minutes earlier that Flight 77 first was observed deviating from its course, something which in the context of what was going on that day would be quite interesting, if not remarkable? Colonel Scott, any comments?

MR. SCOTT: Sir, I think it's also important to understand that like the CONUS region, the FAA is also broken down into subordinate command and control centers as well. I know that the Boston center was talking directly to the Northeast sector. I don't believe Flight 77 was in Boston Center's airspace. They were in Cleveland.

GEN. MCKINLEY: I think the FAA can report accurately on this, but I believe 77 was in Cleveland Center airspace when it developed the problem where they lost its radar image. And I believe -- and the FAA again can testify better to this -- they would take action based on losing that identification in Cleveland.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: Well, actually I think according to the information that we have, the first indication was not a loss of radar contact but rather a course deviation with respect to Flight 77.

Now, I don't mean to take up any more time on this, because we are going to want to follow up on all of this information in great detail. But let me ask whether there is regularly made a tape recording of these open-line communications.

GEN. ARNOLD: (?) Not to my knowledge.

GEN. MCKINLEY: Not to my knowledge.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: Does FAA to your knowledge keep a recording of these crisis situations?

GEN. ARNOLD: (?) I am unaware, but I would certainly direct that to them, please.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: To the best of your knowledge, you don't have anything further to shed light on when you first learned -- you, NORAD -- first learned of Flight 77's probable hijack status prior to 9:24 a.m.?

GEN. ARNOLD: (?) I can provide that for the record. I do not have any further knowledge at this time.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: We would ask that you do so.

GEN. ARNOLD: (?) Yes, sir.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will have some other questions after.

MR. KEAN: Secretary Lehman.

MR. LEHMAN: Thank you. General, I would also like to echo my colleagues' expression of great admiration for you and your predecessor, your command and your pilots, even though they might require long runways to land.

GEN. MCKINLEY: We understand.

MR. LEHMAN: One of the most serious responsibilities we have in addition to air security is identifying the real dysfunctions in our intelligence system that contributed to the tragedy. And we had prior as you know to your testimony Secretary Mineta, who indicated despite the fact of this long litany of events and intelligence reports of the growing probability that aircraft would be used as weapons, nothing ever got to him, and nothing apparently got to you, and I assume, General Arnold, nothing got to you. This would seem to be a pretty significant failure of our system, because it exists to provide product precisely to you, the most important users tasked with defending it. So I would like to ask -- we'll provide you a copy of this, which is from the Joint Inquiry staff statement -- if you could give us your studied assessment of what went wrong in the way you interact with, your command interacts with the intelligence community, and why the product did not get to you. These were pretty dramatic events, facts and intelligence reports. It would be very helpful to us to have your assessments as a customer of the system to what went so seriously wrong that you were still only looking out.

There's another, an issue that I would ask perhaps General Arnold to address, because there's a great deal of unease and distress, I think understandably, among many of the families that somehow those aircraft should have been shot down if people had not made mistakes. And I wonder if you would just take us through each flight, given the posture that NORAD was in at the time, which was national policy and not whatever based on erroneous intelligence perhaps. But given that posture and given the times that NORAD was notified of the deviation from -- the possibility of hijacking, could the aircraft on alert for instance at Otis have intercepted? And then if you could also take us through 77 and 93 as well with the F-16s, which -- and if you would tell us as you take us through what the armament was on the F-15s and the F-16s that were scrambled against 77 and 93.

GEN. ARNOLD: Thank you, sir, and I will try to do that to the best of my ability. And perhaps General McKinley has some data that he could shed light on, because I have been retired a little while, and do not have access to the staff for some of the very specifics on that. But I will try to do my best.

As you know from previous testimony from General Eberhardt to Congress, we were in the middle of a NORAD exercise at that particular time, which means that basically our entire staff was focused on being able to do the air operations center mission, which was our job to do. We had just come out of a video teleconference with the NORAD staff and with our folks at that particular time, when I was handed a note that we had a possible hijacking at Boston center, and it had come from the Northeast Air Defense Command, Colonel Bob Mahr (ph), who is commander up there, and he had requested that I call him immediately. And I was upstairs in our facility, immediately went downstairs, picked up the phone, asking on the way to my staff, "Is this part of the exercise?" Because quite honestly, and frankly we do do hijacking scenarios as we go through these exercises from time to time. But I realized that it was not. This was real life.

And I also remembered as I went downstairs, before I even talked to him, that it had been a long time since we had had a hijacking, but the fact that we had reviewed the procedures of what it is we do for a hijacking, because we were in the middle of an exercise.



Scott appears here, vetting the Toledo, Ohio response once more for the corporate media:

Article published Sunday, December 9, 2001

Toledo's Air Guard called to defend U.S. on Sept. 11
Local pilots some of first into air

F-16s from the Air Guard unit at Toledo Express Airport, like this one flying over Kuwait in 1998, took to the skies on Sept. 11.



In the frantic minutes after terrorists downed three hijacked airliners in New York and Washington, the Air Force sent up jets ready to shoot down any other planes that threatened the East Coast.

Jets from a Massachusetts base circled New York. Jets from Virginia soared over the nation's capitol.

And, guarding the rest of the nation in the first chaotic minutes of the crisis: F-16s from Toledo.

Federal military officials recently confirmed that the 180th Fighter Wing - an Ohio Air National Guard unit based at Toledo Express Airport - was the first unit outside the East Coast to answer the Air Force's plea for immediate help.

And had the last hijacked plane continued west - or had any other hijacked plane headed across the heartland - the Toledo fighter wing was the only unit immediately available to carry out the ultimate act: Shoot it down.

"They had the fuel. They had guns. That's what was needed," said retired Lt. Col. Alan Scott, who has been analyzing the air responses for the Air Force.

Three months after the worst terrorist attack in America's history, new details are emerging about the frenzied minutes from the time the first plane hit the World Trade Center to the time the nation had grounded every civilian plane in the sky.

The man responsible for coordinating the air defense strategy over the hard-hit area - Lt. Col. Robert Marr - confirmed to The Blade last week that the Toledo unit played a critical role as the nation's military geared up for any more attacks.

"It just had a phenomenal response on Sept. 11," Colonel Marr said from his command post in Rome, N.Y.

The new details also reveal a key weakness in the nation's air defense system on Sept. 11 - a weakness that left the interior of the nation more vulnerable.

Up until that day, the military's radar trackers had a Cold War posture of looking outside America's borders for threatening invaders. Those radars were positioned along the continental coasts, leaving blind spots in America's interior.

That meant the military was forced to rely on civilian air traffic controllers at the Federal Aviation Administration to detect what was in the skies - something they're now trying to fix.

"We're working very hard in trying to achieve an interior look," said Colonel Scott, now an Air Force consultant, whose first briefing of the issue was broadcast on C-Span last week.

Toledo's response on Sept. 11 is believed to be the first time the unit has answered a call from the North American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD -

. . .

 link to www.toledoblade.com

SUMMARY of what I take from the information about OHIO and the response

a. seems that these planes were landing at a Cleveland Airport, and that Scott later dissembles officially about their exact whereabouts or times.
b. Garvey actually calls in to Cheney in the White House and said that UAL93 goes down in Ohio.
c. Scott massages the information to the public about both NORAD at the 9-11 commission and
d. Scott massages the information about the Cleveland landings
e. Scott massages the information about the Toledo, Ohio 'response', for public consumption--appears on C-SPAN.
f. Scott was involved in Amalgam Virgo scenario 01, and claims to be 'uninvolved' in the 02 version.
g. Scott is 'retired' though seems strangely, in my opinion, to be very knowledgeable and visible on these issues....
h. Perhaps someone should look into Col. Scott more. It may highlight the response issues and the scenario issues and the Ohio issues at the same time.