 http://www.ceip.org/
WMD IN IRAQ
Evidence and Implications
Summary of New Carnegie Report
WMD in IRAQ: Evidence and Implications, a new study from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, details what the U.S. and international intelligence communities understood about Iraq's weapons programs before the war and outlines policy reforms to improve threat assessments, deter transfer of WMD to terrorists, strengthen the UN weapons inspection process, and avoid politicization of the intelligence process.
The report distills a massive amount of data into side-by-side comparisons of pre-war intelligence, the official presentation of that intelligence, and what is now known about Iraq's programs.
The authors of the report are: Jessica T. Mathews, president; George Perkovich, vice president for studies, and Joseph Cirincione, senior associate and non-proliferation project director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Changes to U.S. Policy
· Revise the National Security Strategy to eliminate a U.S. policy of unilateral preventive war, i.e., preemptive war in absence of imminent threat.
· Create a nonpartisan, independent commission to establish a clearer picture of what the intelligence community knew and believed it knew about Iraq's weapons program.
· Consider changing the post of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) from a political appointment to a career appointment, based on the outcomes of the independent commission.
· Make the security of poorly protected nuclear weapons and stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium a much higher priority for national security policy.
International Action
· The United States and United Nations should together produce a complete history and inventory of Iraq's WMD and missile programs.
· The UN Secretary General should commission a high-level analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the WMD inspection processes in Iraq, and how inspections could be strengthened in the future.
· The UN Security Council should consider creating a permanent, international, nonproliferation inspection capability.
· Make the transfer of WMD a violation of international law.
Changes to Threat Assessments
· Recognize distinctions in the degree of threat posed by the different forms of "weapons of mass destruction" - chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons pose vastly different risks and cost-benefit calculations of actions to combat them.
· Recognize red flags indicating that sound intelligence practices are not being followed.
· Examine and debate the assertion that the combined threat of evil states and terrorism calls for acting on the basis of worst-case reasoning.
· Examine assumption that states will likely transfer WMD to terrorists.
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS
Iraq WMD Was Not An Immediate Threat
· Iraq's nuclear program had been suspended for many years; Iraq focused on preserving a latent, dual-use chemical and probably biological weapons capability, not weapons production.
· Iraqi nerve agents had lost most of their lethality as early as 1991.
· Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, and UN inspections and sanctions effectively destroyed Iraq's large-scale chemical weapon production capabilities.
Inspections Were Working
· Post-war searches suggest the UN inspections were on track to find what was there.
· International constraints, sanctions, procurement, investigations, and the export/import control mechanism appear to have been considerably more effective than was thought.
Intelligence Failed and Was Misrepresented
· Intelligence community overestimated the chemical and biological weapons in Iraq.
· Intelligence community appears to have been unduly influenced by policymakers' views.
· Officials misrepresented threat from Iraq's WMD and ballistic missiles programs over and above intelligence findings.
Terrorist Connection Missing
· No solid evidence of cooperative relationship between Saddam's government and Al Qaeda.
· No evidence that Iraq would have transferred WMD to terrorists-and much evidence to counter it.
· No evidence to suggest that deterrence was no longer operable.
Post-War WMD Search Ignored Key Resources
· Past relationships with Iraqi scientists and officials, and credibility of UNMOVIC experts represent a vital resource that has been ignored when it should be being fully exploited.
· Data from the seven years of UNSCOM/IAEA inspections are absolutely essential. Direct involvement of those who compiled the more-than-30-million- page record is needed.
War Was Not the Best-Or Only-Option
· There were at least two options preferable to a war undertaken without international support: allowing the UNMOVIC/IAEA inspections to continue until obstructed or completed, or imposing a tougher program of "coercive inspections."
|
