| newswire article |
|
|
27.Feb.2003 06:38 |
cryptome hacked
author: abovethesmoke
|
spy back on them who spy on us
|
Cryptome
FEBRUARY 2003
cryptome-hack.htm + Cryptome Hacked February 27, 2003
dtapc.pdf + Decimalisation Table Attacks for PIN Cracking February 21, 2003
nsa022003.txt + National Security Agency Privacy Act Program February 20, 2003
pacc.htm + Protocol Analysis, Composability and Computation February 20, 2003
nypd-eyeball.htm + Eyeballing the NYPD Ammunition Depot February 19, 2003
oni-wwtts.htm + Worldwide Threat to Shipping: Greenpeace et al February 19, 2003
usoge021803.txt + Post-Gov-Job Conflict of Interest Wink Nudge February 18, 2003
wh-breech.htm + Eyeballing the Breech of White House Security February 17, 2003
snimtc-eyeball.htm + Eyeballing San Nicolas Isle Missile Test Center February 16, 2003
war-reason.htm + The practical reason the U.S. is starting a war February 16, 2003
ttic-stasi2.htm + CIA/FBI Terrorist Threat Integration Center February 15, 2003
dc-crock.htm + Washington Admits Terrorism Warning a Crock February 15, 2003
gilmore-v-usa-ht1 + Air Travel ID Hearing 17 January 2003 February 15, 2003
nsbsd-eyeball.htm + Eyeballing Naval Submarine Base San Diego February 14, 2003
tsa021403.txt + Banned Carry-on Devices for Air Travel February 14, 2003
tia-bar.htm + Congress Bars TIA February 12, 2003
tia-cia-nyc.htm + Judge Okays NYC CIA TIA Plus February 12, 2003
cia-threatens.htm + CIA Threatens US Again February 11, 2003
hack-cow.htm + Hacktivismo/Cult of Dead Cow Export 256-bit AES February 11, 2003
uscg021103.txt + Port of San Diego Security Zone February 11, 2003
dvdcca021103.txt + DVDCCA Anti-Trust Membership February 11, 2003
ginm021103.txt + Governors Island National Monument Proclaimed February 11, 2003
disa-stations.htm + Location of US Military Communication Facilities February 10, 2003
dsn-phone.htm + Defense Switched Network Telephone Directory February 9, 2003
tia-update.htm + DoD: Total Information Awareness (TIA) Update February 8, 2003
mi6-mi6.htm + MI6 Recycles MI6 Leaks February 7, 2003
phsac020703.txt + Prez Homeland Spying Open Phone Meet February 7, 2003
dsb020703.txt + Defense Science Panel Secret Meet February 7, 2003
rspa020703.txt + Workshop on Hazardous Pipelines February 7, 2003
tsa020603.txt + Transporting Explosives from Canada February 7, 2003
za-cb-wmd.htm + South Africa's Chemical and Biological WMDs February 5, 2003
uscg020403.txt + Hawaii Port Security February 5, 2003
wmd-spot.htm + Finding WMDs in Iraq (and Elsewhere) February 3, 2003
fda020303.txt + Rules for Food Security Against Bioterrorism February 3, 2003
rspa020303.txt + Secret Hazardous Pipeline Mapping February 3, 2003
nrc020303.txt + Clean-up of Depleted Uranium Munitions February 3, 2003
atfe013103.txt + New Agency for Drunk Smokers' Guns and Bombs February 3, 2003
epa013103.txt + Relocating Transuranic Waste to WIPP February 3, 2003
ksc-eyeball.htm + Eyeballing Kennedy Space Center February 2, 2003
cn-grab.htm + Missile Technology Sent to China February 1, 2003
O f f s i t e
RFID Spying on Consumers February 25, 2003
Pringles War Drivers Reverse-Sigint CA Spooks /D February 25, 2003
MacICBM Instant Terrorist ICBMs February 24, 2003
STFU Silenced in Court /R February 24, 2003
Lottery DoJ Stoned on Spy Witchcraft February 21, 2003
Fready Homeland Horror Thrills February 19, 2003
Intel Sick Why US Intelligence is Dysfunctional /S February 18, 2003
SEVP TIA.edu Ratting on Foreign Students February 17, 2003
Fun Die Indo-Pakistani Deadpool /J February 17, 2003
Boomers 4 Explosives Engineers February 15, 2003
Boomers 3 Customers of Explosives Engineers February 15, 2003
Boomers 2 Bomb Technicians Blow Up Explosives Makers February 15, 2003
Boomers 1 Explosives Makers February 15, 2003
wtcbctf NYC CYAs Too Little/Late Building Code /D February 15, 2003
Fear Farm FBI/CIA Counterterrorists to Cultivate Fear February 15, 2003
Paper Vapor DC Admits Digital Pearl Harbor Was Vaporwar February 15, 2003
NSTSC National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace February 15, 2003
NSTPI National Strategy to Protect Infrastructure February 15, 2003
MI6-MI6 UK Admits MI6 Recycled MI6 Leaks /J February 10, 2003
NYC2012 NYC Plans for 2012 FOIA'd /T February 10, 2003
Home Spy 2 Draft PATRIOT Act 2 /M February 8, 2003
FISA Peep FISA Appeals Court Hearing /S February 8, 2003
Smear FBI Smearing Chinese Hi-Tech Students February 7, 2003
CGGPT Crypto Gardening Guide and Planting Tips /P February 5, 2003
SCIF CIA DCID6/9 Physical Security of SCIFs /S February 5, 2003
See Mail Security of E-Mail (Except Spying by Bosses) February 4, 2003
Spy Jobs Jobs at NZ GCSB /J February 3, 2003
Tit-cry Screams for More HomeSec Pork February 3, 2003
Spy IT IT Wonk New Head of GCHQ February 1, 2003
Cryptout Recent Listings
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6 October 2002: JYA.com and some of the other Cryptome archives are temporarily unavailable.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
27 February 2003
Restoration of deleted files is about 80% complete and should be finished later today.
Verio, Cryptome's ISP, has traced the source of the hack to the last hop, which was from a proxy apparently in Germany. The original source has not yet been determined. Cryptome received this:
Status: U
Return-Path: < bighawk@kryptology.org>
Received: from mail5-sh.home.nl ([213.51.128.16])
by hazard.mail.atl.earthlink.net (Earthlink Mail Service) with ESMTP id 18O4iu22T3Nl3qG0
for < jya@pipeline.com>; Wed, 26 Feb 2003 11:20:42 -0500 (EST)
Received: from kryptology.org ([212.120.80.87]) by mail5-sh.home.nl
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for < jya@pipeline.com>; Wed, 26 Feb 2003 17:18:22 +0100
Message-ID: < 3E5CE841.5070808@kryptology.org>
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2003 17:16:01 +0100
From: Jogchem de Groot < bighawk@kryptology.org>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; SunOS sun4u; en-US; rv:1.2.1) Gecko/20030109
X-Accept-Language: en-us, en
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: jya@pipeline.com
Subject: Regarding cryptome.org defacement.
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Good afternoon,
Today the defacement of cryptome.org was brought under my attention. And
i was unpleasently surprised that this was done under my internet-identity.
bighawk / bighawk@kryptology.org. Most likely as an attempt to bring me into
discredit, or to get me into trouble.
I have absolutely nothing to do with this breach. And i really regret
that this happened and that it happened falsely with statements that i
am behind this.
Since a few months, a few individuals have been constantly trying to
bring me into discredit. I believe this was their next step. Until now
these attempts were relatively innocent and could be easily ignored.
Criminal actions as these i did not expect.
As i mentioned, i have an idea on what individuals are behind this and i
would like to offer you all information i have which could eventually
help identifying the responsibles.
I hope i have informed you enough with this and i hope the actual
responsible individual(s) will be identified asap.
If you need any additional information, or if you are interested to hear
in what information i might be able to obtain related to this. Please
let me hear.
Kind regards,
Jogchem
_____
Cryptome was hacked this morning, 26 February 2003. All files were deleted. They will be restored later today.
Here are automatic mirrors of Cryptome for bookmarking:
www.eu.cryptome.org
www.nl.cryptome.org
www.at.cryptome.org
Anonymous operators of these mirrors swear no access logs are kept, not even for the usual undisclosed purposes, so be sure to protect yourself there and here and all around the Net.
John Young
< jya@pipeline.com>
Cryptome Administrator
251 West 89th Street
New York, NY 10024
212-873-8700
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Retailers are pioneering radio-frequency identification, in which electronic sensors monitor signals sent by radio chips embedded in products. "I don't think the average consumer understands the threat to personal privacy that these kinds of technologies can present," said Alan N. Sutin, a partner specializing in information technology at the law firm of Greenberg Traurig. Even the United States Postal Service has gotten into the act. Last month, it promoted Charles E. Bravo, until then its chief technology officer, to the new job of senior vice president for intelligent mail and address quality, and charged him with studying tracking technologies.
-- Claudia Deutsch and Barnaby Feder, A Radio Chip in Every Consumer Product, February 25, 2003 (offsite)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abstract. We present an attack on hardware security modules used by retail banks for the secure storage and verification of customer PINs in ATM (cash machine) infrastructures. By using adaptive decimalisation tables and guesses, the maximum amount of information is learnt about the true PIN upon each guess. It takes an average of 15 guesses to determine a four digit PIN using this technique, instead of the 5000 guesses intended. In a single 30 minute lunch-break, an attacker can thus discover approximately 7000 PINs rather than 24 with the brute force method. With a £300 withdrawal limit per card, the potential bounty is raised from £7200 to £2.1 million and a single motivated attacker could withdraw £30-50 thousand of this each day. This attack thus presents a serious threat to bank security.
-- Mike Bond and Piotr Zielinski, Decimalisation Table Attacks for PIN Cracking, February 2003
See also "Protocol Analysis, Composability and Computation":  http://cryptome.org/pacc.htm
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Steve
To: "' jya@pipeline.com'" < jya@pipeline.com>
Subject: re: "Eyeballing the NYPD Ammunition Depot"
Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2003 11:16:40 -0500
I've enjoyed your Web site for several years now, and as a communications technology-policy reporter have considered it a great resource. However, having seen your recent posting, "Eyeballing the NYPD Ammunition Depot" (February 19, 2003), which contains several pictures of the aforementioned facility, I have to express my disgust with you.
You are an irresponsible asshole, plain and simple.
_____
Cryptome: The NYPD wanted its ammo depot internationally-featured by the Coast Guard in order to justify its CIA-inspired domestic spying operation and for enhanced funding from the terrorism slushpot. The facility is well-known for its repeated featuring in local news. No NYC agency is as addicted to publicity as the NYPD, and its current commissioner, Ray Kelly, is a typical celebrity whore in the long tradition of the force, ever ready to whitewash the killing of a perp or the savaging of a political protester to extort the citizenry in the name of public safety aka terrorism in the streets. There's a civil war going on, glossed by international terrorism, and cops and spies couldn't be happier about it, not only in NYC but among all the globe's governmental perps chattering on the back-channels and spying on their citizenry. NYC's Police HQ has bunkered itself for PR-vanity just like the DC gang has gone underground to ga-ga the yokels. And the PR-addicts are always careful to get their rathole hideouts big-eyeballed in the media, no pictures allowed as a teaser to please post leaked pix worldwide.
FWIW, nobody featured in Cryptome's Eyeball series has complained, just made entries in their overflowing dossiers.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
To: ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk
Subject: Citibank tries to gag crypto bug disclosure
Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2003 09:57:34 +0000
From: Ross Anderson < Ross.Anderson@cl.cam.ac.uk>
Citibank is trying to get an order in the High Court today gagging public disclosure of crypto vulnerabilities:
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/citibank_gag.pdf
I have written to the judge opposing the order:
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/citibank_response.pdf
The background is that my student Mike Bond has discovered some really horrendous vulnerabilities in the cryptographic equipment commonly used to protect the PINs used to identify customers to cash machines:
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/TechReports/UCAM-CL-TR-560.pdf
These vulnerabilities mean that bank insiders can almost trivially find out the PINs of any or all customers. The discoveries happened while Mike and I were working as expert witnesses on a `phantom withdrawal' case.
The vulnerabilities are also scientifically interesting:
http://cryptome.org/pacc.htm
For the last couple of years or so there has been a rising tide of phantoms. I get emails with increasing frequency from people all over the world whose banks have debited them for ATM withdrawals that they deny making. Banks in many countries simply claim that their systems are secure and so the customers must be responsible. It now looks like some of these vulnerabilities have also been discovered by the bad guys. Our courts and regulators should make the banks fix their systems, rather than just lying about security and dumping the costs on the customers.
Curiously enough, Citi was also the bank in the case that set US law on phantom withdrawals from ATMs (Judd v Citibank). They lost. I hope that's an omen, if not a precedent ...
_____
Abstract
Abstract. We present an attack on hardware security modules used by retail banks for the secure storage and verification of customer PINs in ATM (cash machine) infrastructures. By using adaptive decimalisation tables and guesses, the maximum amount of information is learnt about the true PIN upon each guess. It takes an average of 15 guesses to determine a four digit PIN using this technique, instead of the 5000 guesses intended. In a single 30 minute lunch-break, an attacker can thus discover approximately 7000 PINs rather than 24 with the brute force method. With a £300 withdrawal limit per card, the potential bounty is raised from £7200 to £2.1 million and a single motivated attacker could withdraw £30-50 thousand of this each day. This attack thus presents a serious threat to bank security.
-- Mike Bond and Piotr Zielinski, Decimalisation table attacks for PIN cracking, February 2003
Cryptome mirror: http://cryptome.org/dtapc.pdf
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Don't Be Afraid, Be Fready--One individual, One family, One Community At A Time
The threat of terrorism forces us to make a choice. We can be afraid, or we can be fready. Today America's families declare, "We will not be afraid. We will be fready!" The Department of Homeland Security announces Fready.Gov to help American families prepare for even unlikely emergency scenarios.
-- http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Ross Anderson < Ross.Anderson@cl.cam.ac.uk>
To: ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk
Subject: Yet another failure of commercial cryptographic equipment
Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2003 17:52:13 +0000
I gave a talk at Cambridge yesterday in which I described a new and
interesting family of attacks on cryptographic equipment. These
attacks defeat machines such as the Racal RG7000 and the IBM 4758/CCA
which are commonly used to protect the PINs and keys used in automatic
teller machines.
The paper is available online at:
http://research.microsoft.com/~aherbert/volume63.pdf [4.8MB]
as pages 27-30 in the PDF. [Cryptome's HTML of the paper: pacc.htm]
I got a fax yesterday informing me that an application is to be
brought in the High Court, it seems by Citibank, on Thursday 20th
February for `relief in relation to the protection of information
which they accept as being confidential and which ought not to be in
the public domain.'
I hope that no English court would go so far as to censor already
published material. However, one just can't tell these days ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RE-READING RICHARD SHELBY
When the findings and recommendations of last year's congressional
joint inquiry into September 11 were published, Sen. Richard
Shelby (R-AL) independently issued a lengthy statement of his own
"additional views" on the subject.
The bulky document was largely overlooked at the time, except for
its potshots at CIA Director Tenet, and by now it has nearly been
forgotten. But Shelby's statement is littered with telling
observations and original insights, and no one with an interest
in intelligence policy should miss it.
Noting that "The CIA's Directorate of Operations usually refuses
even to let CIA analysts see its own operational cable traffic,"
Sen. Shelby establishes that dysfunctional information policies,
including inappropriate controls on information, are at the root
of much of what ails the U.S. intelligence bureaucracy.
"The fundamental intellectual assumptions that have guided our
Intelligence Community's approach to managing national security
information for half a century may be in some respects crucially
flawed," he writes.
Along the way, he challenges some longstanding practices that are
so deeply-rooted that no one normally thinks to question them,
such as the application of the "need to know" standard for
sharing information.
"It may not be true," Sen. Shelby proposes radically, "that
information-holders -- the traditional arbiters of who can see
'their' data -- are the entities best placed to determine whether
outsiders have any 'need to know' data in their possession.
Analysts who seek access to information, it turns out, may well
be the participants best equipped to determine what their
particular expertise and contextual understanding can bring to
the analysis of certain types of data."
But information sharing is not exactly the solution either,
"inasmuch as 'sharing' connotes ownership by the party that
decides to share it, an idea that is antithetical to truly
empowering analysts to connect all the right 'dots'."
As for intelligence reform, "hard-wiring the IC in order to fight
terrorists... is precisely the wrong answer, because such an
approach would surely leave us unprepared for the next major
threat, whatever it turns out to be." Rather, "we need an
Intelligence Community agile enough to evolve as threats evolve,
on a continuing basis."
The new regime also poses challenges for intelligence oversight,
he notes. "Since the Department of Justice has taken the
position that the intelligence oversight committees of Congress
should not be permitted to see any grand jury information, this
means that there is no oversight of what use is made of grand
jury material passed to the Intelligence Community.... The 108th
Congress would do well to consider the civil liberties
implications of passing grand jury information to the
Intelligence Community without effective oversight."
There is naturally much to argue over, and disagree with, in the
84 page report. But on balance, Sen. Shelby's report is among
the most thoughtful and the most rigorously argued congressional
writing on intelligence in many years.
Sen. Shelby's December 10, 2002, report on "September 11 and the
Imperative of Reform in the U.S. Intelligence Community"
may be found here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_rpt/shelby.html
_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.
To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, send email to
secrecy_news-request@lists.fas.org
with "subscribe" in the body of the message.
To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a blank email message to
secrecy_news-remove@lists.fas.org
OR email your request to saftergood@fas.org
Secrecy News is archived at:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note on accessing the New York Times and other sites: best to spoof information requested -- it's only valuable to lying, cheating, sneak-thief data miners, that is, vile advertisers and total information assurancers. Or flood the deep throats with JY's info below already abused by zillions of spam-pukers and dossier secreteers.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Trying to apply the lessons learned at a terrible cost on Sept. 11, 2001, the New York City Buildings Department yesterday outlined a future in which office towers could have larger, sturdier and more numerous stairwells; full sprinkler systems; and better protected ductwork.
The agency's World Trade Center Building Code Task Force recommended that owners and managers develop plans for fully evacuating office buildings under catastrophic circumstances, above and beyond the floor-by-floor evacuation plans required for fire safety. It called for the development of a simple, uniform information card for every office building that firefighters could consult quickly to pinpoint a structure's vital features.
And it urged collaborative compliance with the city building code by diplomatic missions, federal agencies and quasi-governmental authorities like the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which are otherwise exempt. All told, 21 recommendations were released by Patricia J. Lancaster, commissioner of the Buildings Department. Fifteen would have to be enacted as law, either in the zoning resolution, fire code or building code, which may itself be completely revised, following a model like the International Building Code or one devised by the National Fire Protection Association.
-- David Dunlaps, 9/11's Hard Lessons Lead Agency to Urge Tougher Building Code, February 15, 2003
The -- WTC-surely-to-be-repeated when pols and developers simulate hazard protections to assure fat profits from terrorism-generated tax subsidies having long ago adopted the role model mil-intel-industry way of camouflaging failure through national security secrecy then scaring the shit out of the public to extort more billions -- report:
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dob/pdf/wtcbctf.pdf
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2003 09:54:33 -0800
Subject: The practical reason the U.S. is starting a war
From: Tim May < tcmay@got.net>
To: cypherpunks@lne.com
I've been watching the Security Council session this morning. Positions
are established.
It's clear the U.S. is preparing to start a war. Nothing Blix or the
other inspectors could say would stop the massive U.S. mobilization
from continuing.
Before going further, let me say I am no friend of Iraq. But "no
foreign entanglements" was and is good advice, and the U.S. mostly
followed it for its first 130 years of existence. As it became a
statist power around 1915 it began to form various alliances. The huge
increase in entangling alliances and Big Brotherism happened a bit
later.
I don't think the 1991 war was justified, either. The invasion of
Kuwait is the sort of thing nations do to other smaller and vastly
weaker nations--the Kuwaiti oil princes had plenty of time to have
built Swiss-type defenses, but chose not to. (Part of counting on Big
Brother to protect one is the "moral hazard" which results.)
And whatever the 1991 justifications were (*), the justifications today
are far, far weaker.
(* Note that in 1990-91 there were vigorous debates in Congress,
including a razor-thin margin approving a quasi-war declaration. No
such debate is happening now. Likewise, the "Alliance" was unified,
with several Arab countries participating with troops and supplies. No
such alliance today.)
Further, the costs to U.S. taxpayers to occupy and "rebuild" (say
what?!) Iraq are now estimated to be about $45 billion per year. That's
a lot of money.
* The reason is clear: the juggernauts of the military buildup are
rolling: 5 carrier battle groups now either in the region or arriving
within the next 10 days. More than 100,000 U.S. and British troops
massing in Kuwait, Qatar, and other staging areas.
* The new moon, when moonlight is minimal, is happening around 1 March.
This is the standard military time to attack, and fits with the
cresting of the military buildup. (Carriers and aircraft and troops
should be in place by 25 February, and so the war could start any time
after that.)
* If there is any delay, the optimum time for an attack is lost. And if
the delay extends to early May, the ground temperatures in Iraq make
wearing of chemical gear very problematic. (So say the experts I have
seen interviewed: the rubber suits don't do well in 35 C ambient
temperatures, let alone in 45 C summer temperatures.)
* So the U.S. has effectively already launched the war by expending so
much money ("treasure" in the bullshit-talk of political pundits) in
massing troops and ships in the area. To pull back, as must happen if
no war starts, would make the next mobilization harder to justify.
* Where's Congress? Where's the debate, the declaration of war? Answer:
They're sitting this one out, avoiding the cameras, debating minor
bills. (The debate on USA Patriot II, aka The Reich Protectorate and
Modification of the Bill of Rights Act of 2003, is happening behind
closed doors...to the extend the pork-gobbling Congresscritters are
even getting involved at all.)
All of these issues point to what a clusterfuck this is turning into,
exposing the hypocrisy of the U.S. position that it doesn't start wars
(a claim that can never be made again with a straight face if this war
starts...though some would say this claim has been bogus for the past
40 years). And exposing the hypocrisy of the notion that Congress
debates important issues. And of course the U.N. suffers.
Not all of these things are bad. Which is why I am hoping for a war. A
war that goes badly, a war that results in world opinion turning
sharply against the American aggressor state. A war that causes Iran to
decide to seize some disputed territory (what we gonna do then, homey?).
A war that returns the United States to blissful isolationism.
A war that, Allah willing, causes Washington, D.C. to be be hit with a
suitcase nuke, cleansing it of a million criminal politicians and two
million inner city welfare mutants. 'Tis a consummation devoutly to be
wished.
--Tim May
"Ben Franklin warned us that those who would trade liberty for a little
bit of temporary security deserve neither. This is the path we are now
racing down, with American flags fluttering."-- Tim May, on events
following 9/11/2001
-----
Responses to this message:
http://cryptome.org/war-reason.htm
Responses welcome; send to: jya@pipeline.com
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C33. CHAPTER 33. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION
C33.1 Data Element Explanation.
C33.1.1 Describes the geographical location (GEOLOC) of a communication terminal or facility in terms of the established name of the place as listed in DIA, NIMA, and U.S. Geographical Survey published Gazetteer or DOT Atlas for CONUS. Guidelines concerning assignment of GEOLOC are as follows:
C33.1.1.1 Only approved GEOLOC as contained in this chapter will be used. Specifically, DOD installations (i.e., camp, post, station, etc.) will be utilized as the GEOLOC.
C33.1.1.2 If the GIG facility is not at a DOD installation, then the city, town, etc. will be used.
C33.1.1.3 If a GEOLOC for a desired location is not contained in the tables T33.1A through T.33.1Z, DISA (NS51), should be formally requested to assign a new GEOLOC for that particular location.
-- Geographical Location of US Military Communication Facilities, January 31, 2002
Zipped file of all US military communication facilities: http://cryptome.org/disa/disa-stations.zip (267KB)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM VOICE PRECEDENCE SYSTEM
The National Communications System (NCS) Voice Precedence System, was established by NCS Memorandum 1-70, dated 14 February 1970, is directed for use by all authorized users of voice communications facilities. Since the effectiveness of the system depends on the cooperation of the people authorized to use it. Users must: (1) be familiar with the purposes of each precedence category and the type of call that is assigned the precedence, and (2) exercise care not to request or use a precedence higher than required.
The NCS Voice Precedence System does not make provisions for conducting test and exercise calls. Those activities or individuals authorized or required to conduct such test or exercise calls will use a precedence consistent with the nature of the test or exercise. When the originator of the test or exercise call has contacted the called party, the call will be identified immediately as a flash, immediate, or priority precedence test or exercise.
The following examples should aid users in determining what precedence to use when placing a call. These examples are according to the NCS Voice Precedence System, but are not to be used exclusively for determination of the precedence of a call. This should be at the discretion of the originator of the call.
Flash Override. Flash override is considered a capability, not a level of precedence. Exercising this capability preempts calls of all other levels or precedence. The flash override capability is available to the following users:
The President of the United States of America
The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS
Commanders of Unified Commands
Flash. Flash calls preempt immediate, priority, and routine calls. Listed below are examples of flash calls:
Calls pertaining to C2 of military forces essential to defense and retaliation
Critical intelligence essential to national survival
Conduct of diplomatic negotiations critical to ceasing or limiting hostilities
Dissemination of critical civil alert information essential to national survival
Continuity of Federal Government functions essential to national survival
Fulfillment of critical United States internal security functions essential to national survival
Catastrophic events of national or international significance
Immediate. Immediate calls preempt priority and routine calls and are reserved for communications pertaining to situations that gravely affect the security of national and Allied forces. Listed below are some examples of immediate calls:
Reconstitution of forces in a post-attack period
Intelligence essential to national security
Conduct of diplomatic negotiations to reduce or limit the threat of war
Implementation of Federal Government actions essential to national survival
Situations that gravely affect the security of the United States
Civil defense actions concerning the direction of the population and their survival
Disaster or events serious enough to have an immediate and detrimental effect on the welfare of the population
Vital information having an immediate effect on aircraft, spacecraft, or missile operations
Distress assistance
Priority. Priority calls preempt routine calls and are reserved for communications requiring expeditious action by called parties furnishing essential information for conducting Government operations.
Routine. The routine precedence applies to official Government communications that require rapid transmission by telephonic means, but do not require preferential handling. A routine call does not preempt any other call.
-- Defense Switched Network (DSN) Telephone Directory, February 9, 2003
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DCID 6/9, Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) was approved by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) on 30 January 1994.
A complete copy of DCID 6/9 consists of the basic DCID and annexes A through G. The annexes are as follows:
Annex A - SCIF Checklist (approved 27 May 1994)
Annex B - Intrusion Detection Systems (revised 18 November 2002)
Annex C - Tactical Operations/Field Training (approved 27 May 1994)
Part I - Ground Operation
Part II- Aircraft/Airborne Operation
Part III - Shipborne Operation
Annex D -
Part I - Electronic Equipment in SCIFs (approved 30 January 1994)
Part II - Handling and Disposal of Laser Toner Cartridges (revised 5 June 1998)
Annex E - Acoustical control and Sound Masking Techniques (approved 30 January 1994)
Annex F - Personnel Access Controls (revised 18 November 2002)
Annex G - Telephone Security (revised 18 November 2002)
-- Central Intelligence Agency, (DCID 6/9) — MANUAL Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, November 2002 (offsite)
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Cryptome: No invention has provided greater opportunity for secret spying than electronic mail, a privacy violating practice more abused than Internet spying. Bosses now regularly use covert means to spy on e-mail of workers, schools to spy on students, parents to spy on children, lovers to spy on each other, governments to spy on citizens and other governments, feds to spy on local law enforcement, private eyes to spy on everyone. The key performers in e-mail spying are the sysadmins who install and operate the systems, along with network security firms hired to back-up in-house IT spys. No e-mail system is free of spying, usually camouflaged by procedures for maintenance and security.
Security of Electronic Mail: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistbul/01-03.pdf
Even so, no other method works so well to counter-spy privacy violators who use e-mail surveillance programs, for every e-mail spying tool leaves a trail of its activities. By working backward from e-mail stings it is possible to trace the origin of the spying, the methods used and their identifying characteristics. Counter-spying sysadmins and out-sourced network security firms, their actions and digital logs, and reports to bosses and customers, can show the pervasiveness of e-mail spying. A quick test for e-mail spying is to encrypt e-mail and watch for reactions. A ban on e-mail encryption is a sure sign of e-mail spying by peeping pornographers.
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Encryption export controls protect U.S. national security, foreign policy, and law enforcement interests. Encryption products can, for example, be used to conceal the communications of terrorists, drug smugglers, and others intent on harming U.S. interests. Cryptographic products and software also have military and intelligence applications that, in the hands of hostile nations, could pose a threat to U.S. national security.
The Secretary has determined the United States has the ability to effectively enforce these controls. Detection of some encryption transactions is difficult since encryption components are often incorporated into other products and encryption software can be transferred over the Internet. However, the importance and value ascribed to commercial encryption products does lead to transfers and distributions that leave a trail that can be followed. In FY 2002, the Department of Commerce fined companies a total of $230,000 for export violations that involved controlled encryption items. It is easier to enforce controls on proprietary encryption technology and commercial encryption commodities and software than it is to restrict free distributions of "open source" encryption.
-- Bureau of Industry and Security, 2003 Foreign Policy Report, January 29, 2003
International Cryptography Freedom:
http://cryptome.org/crypto-free.htm
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Cryptome CD
For a CD of the Cryptome archive of 9,200 files from June 1996 to June 2002 (~600MB), click PayPal or send $100 donation and mail address to John Young, 251 West 89th Street, New York, NY 10024.
Cryptome Archives
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Little-requested files are periodically culled. If you get a 404, request restoration of the file to: jya@pipeline.com
Cryptout
Post-Latest
Cryptomb 12
Jul-Dec 2002
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Jan-Jun 2002
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Jan-Jun 2001
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Jun-Dec 2000
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Jan-May 2000
Following archives, formerly at jya.com, are temporarily offline.
Cryptomb 6
Jul-Dec 1999
Cryptomb 5
Jan-Jun 1999
Cryptomb 4
Jun-Dec 1998
Cryptomb 3
Jan-May 1998
Cryptomb 2
Jun-Dec 1997
Cryptomb 1
To May 1997
Privacy Alert: To balance the load on Cryptome automatic mirrors have been established:
www.eu.cryptome.org -- the main mirror, which has two or more hardly transparent back-ups:
www.nl.cryptome.org
www.at.cryptome.org
Anonymous operators of these mirrors swear no access logs are kept, not even for the usual undisclosed purposes, so be sure to protect yourself there and here and all around the Net.
A caution on bots:
Blocks on some 300 abusive machines/domains have been lifted, temporarily. Idiot bots are the worst Net trashers, so please don't let them gobble unattended. Boxes gulping more than 100 files per day will be blocked.
Anybody -- gov, mil, edu, com, or individual -- can download all the files here, the whole 9,000+ if desired, preferrably limited to a hundred per day. However, malconfigured bots and spiders that repetitively download mindlessly, or generate thousands of error messages for files already downloaded, and in doing so excluding others' access, are not welcome and will be blocked in perpetuity. Innocents affected complain to jya@pipeline.com
______________________________
Thanks to A for mirror:
http://www.lessgov.org/cryptome
Thanks to SC for crypto software:
http://caunter.ca/crypto.html
Thanks to AJ for mirrors:
http://cryptome.sabotage.org
ftp://ftp.zedz.net/pub/varia/Cryptome/cryptome.org/
the whole shebang is available at:
ftp://ftp.zedz.net/pub/varia/Cryptome/
Thanks to mb for mirror:
http://while1.org/~xm/cryptome.tgz
Thanks to VP for mirror:
http://munitions.vipul.net/documents/cryptome/
Thanks to GB:
People who want/need a copy of Cryptome as of Sep 16 2001 can get a copy at
http://www.parrhesia.com/cryptome.tgz (248 Mb!)
or bit-by-bit at
http://www.parrhesia.com/cryptome/
For people who can do FTP, which usually transfers faster than HTTP, it's also at
ftp://bivens.parrhesia.com/cryptome.tgz
Quintessenz mirror located in Vienna, Austria:
http://cryptome.lo-res.org/
Australian mirror:
http://www.infosecwest.com/cryptome/
Cryptome welcomes documents for publication that are prohibited by governments worldwide, in particular material on freedom of expression, privacy, cryptology, dual-use technologies, national security, intelligence, and blast protection -- open, secret and classified documents -- but not limited to those.
Documents are removed from this site only by order served directly by a US court having jurisdiction. No court order has ever been served; any order will be published here or elsewhere if gagged by order. Bluffs will be published if comical but otherwise ignored.
Send by e-mail, fax or mail:
Cryptome Administrator: John Young
E-mail: jya@pipeline.com
Tel: (US) 212-873-8700
Fax: (US) 212-787-6102
Mail: 251 West 89th Street, New York, NY 10024
April 25, 2002: New PGP 6.5.8 Key:
ID: 0xA126BC05
Fingerprint:
4BBD 49A8 9116 52FF 9CF9 C411 443D 0394 A126 BC05
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Version: PGPfreeware 6.5.8 for non-commercial use < http://www.pgp.com>
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Cartome is a companion site to Cryptome. It is an archive of spatial and geographic documents on privacy, cryptography, dual-use technologies, national security and intelligence -- communicated by imagery systems: cartography, photography, photogrammetry, steganography, climatography, seismography, geography, camouflage, maps, images, drawings, charts, diagrams, imagery intelligence (IMINT) and their reverse-panopticon and counter-deception potential. Administrator is architect Deborah Natsios, longtime Cryptome partner.
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