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imperialism & war

Reasons Not to Invade Iraq, by George Bush Sr.

From "Why We Didn't Remove Saddam" by George Bush [Sr.] and Brent Scowcroft, Time (2 March 1998)
"While we hoped that popular revolt or coup would topple Saddam, neither the U.S. nor the countries of the region wished to see the breakup of the Iraqi state. We were concerned about the long-term balance of power at the head of the Gulf. Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq, would have violated our guideline about not changing objectives in midstream, engaging in "mission creep," and would have incurred incalculable human and political costs. Apprehending him was probably impossible. We had been unable to find Noriega in Panama, which we knew intimately. We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other allies pulling out as well. Under those circumstances, furthermore, we had been self-consciously trying to set a pattern for handling aggression in the post-cold war world. Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the U.N.'s mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international response to aggression we hoped to establish. Had we gone the invasion route, the U.S. could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land. It would have been a dramatically different--and perhaps barren--outcome."

homepage: homepage: http://thememoryhole.com/mil/bushsr-iraq.htm

THEIR COULD BE A BOOK ON THIS 10.Oct.2002 13:53

atomic frog

i think sadamn's move into kuwait was oked by bush. his people made big dough. military contractors in texas took in 75 billion in a short time, compared to 12-13 billion the year before. here are other items...

Reconstruction costs, which some foreign observers initially put as high as US$100 billion, appear to be more modest, perhaps in the range of US$20? to US$25? billion. The largest postwar expense the government faces is not reconstruction, but the debt it incurred to coalition allies to help pay for Operation Desert Storm, an amount that came to at least US$20 billion, and continuing high defense expenditures (see table 12, Appendix). Reconstruction costs have been met largely from Kuwait's reduced investments (the Financial Times estimated in February 1992 that Kuwait had lost as much as US$30 billion of its prewar investment portfolio); from returning oil revenues, which for fiscal year 1992 were only expected to generate US$2.4 billion; and from borrowing on international money markets. In October 1991, the government announced plans to borrow US$5 billion for the first phase of a five-year loan program. The loan would be the largest in history. In mid-1992 one study indicated that as much as 30 percent of 1993 revenue will be needed to pay interest on various government debts, which were expected to exceed US$37 billion by the end of 1992.

Military Capabilities of the Persian Gulf States
During the decade after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, ((all)) the gulf states set out to strengthen their armed forces by converting to the most modern weapons they could obtain and assimilate. By 1993 each state had at least a modest inventory of tanks and other armored equipment, air defense missiles, combat aircraft, armed helicopters, and missile-armed naval craft with which to deter an intruder.


If bush.corp does this stupid thing, take iraq and kuwait. see how they resemble "our ally" in the region..
Kuwait  http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+kw0063)
Human Rights Practices
Prior to the occupation of Kuwait in 1990, the principal human rights concerns, aside from widespread restriction on the exercise of political expression, were instances of arbitrary arrest and mistreatment of prisoners and lack of due process in security trials. A number of Kuwaitis were arrested between late 1989 and mid-1990 for political reasons and for participating in unlicensed gatherings. Noncitizens could be arbitrarily expelled if deemed security risks and were also subject to deportation if they were unable to find work after being released from their initial employment. Some foreigners reportedly were held in deportation centers for up to five years because they were unable to provide for their own travel out of the country. According to the Department of State, there were plausible reports of occasional torture and violence in apprehending and interrogating criminal suspects.

The seven-month Iraqi occupation subjected Kuwaitis to a systematic terror campaign that included extrajudicial killings, torture and other inhuman treatment, kidnappings, and arbitrary arrest and detention. There were many credible accounts of killings, not only of members of the Kuwaiti resistance but also of their families, other civilians, and young children. Attacks on Iraqi soldiers resulted in reprisal actions in neighborhoods where attacks had taken place and included summary and random execution of innocent civilians. Many Kuwaiti citizens also disappeared at the hands of the Iraqi occupation authorities. Large-scale executions of young men by gunfire or by hanging were reported. About 850 Kuwaitis remained unaccounted for in early 1993, many of them presumably killed while in Iraqi detention. Iraq insisted that it had no Kuwaiti prisoners.

After the restoration of the amirate government in 1991, there were many reports of beatings and torture to extract confessions from suspected collaborators. The Department of State estimated that forty-five to fifty Palestinian and other foreigners were tortured to death by police or military personnel. As many as 5,800 persons, mostly non-Kuwaitis, were detained on suspicion of collaboration during the four months of martial law that followed the country's liberation. Many arrests were arbitrary, and some detainees were held for months without being charged. As of early 1993, about 900 persons were still in detention; these included persons convicted in the State Security Court or martial law courts and those under deportation order but with no place to go. Of the prewar population of about 400,000 Palestinians resident in Kuwait, only about 30,000 remain. Most of the departures occurred during the Iraqi occupation: the remainder left because of less favorable living circumstances or Kuwaiti pressure.

 http://www.prwatch.org/
 http://palestinechronicle.com/index.php
 http://www.hedweb.com/siteoday/2002.htm
 http://democrats.com/elandslide/petition.cfm? /www.jpost.com
 http://www.petitiononline.com/ddc12/petition.html
 http://www.petitiononline.com/warcrime/petition.html
 http://www.apfn.org/apfn/rule.htm
 http://www.veganoutreach.com/whyvegan/animals.html
THEIR COULD BE A BOOK ON THIS
THEIR COULD BE A BOOK ON THIS